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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP36928
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
OwMttation niUkdwig
UMI EP36928
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest'
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106 - 1346
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
y
VERMEER'S GAZE AND PROMISCUOUS VISION:
A STUDY OF MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY'S 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION
The scientist, Thomas. Kuhn tells us, "can have no recourse 
above or beyond what he sees with his eyes and instruments."[1] 
His perception, refined and specialized through observational 
tools, serves as the "final authority." This view, which he 
attributes to a philosophical paradigm first initiated by 
Descartes, is dependant upon the presupposition that sensory 
experience is "fixed and neutral."[2] We all share the same 
sense data; it is only our judgements about that data which 
differ. Science interprets this neutral data, formulating 
theories and explanations which fit the data as precisely as 
possible. In this manner we find the best picture of the real 
world that we can obtain.
But Kuhn also points out that this viewpoint concerning the 
primordial fixedness of perception "no longer functions 
effectively, and the attempts to make it do so through the 
introduction of a neutral language of observations now seem to 
me hopeless."[3] He points to modern experiments in psychology
r
which show "two men with the same retinal impressions can see 
different things."[4] Further, he points out that any attempt to 
formulate a language of "pure percepts" inevitably "embodies a 
host of expectations about nature and fails to function the 
moment these expectations are violated."[5] He concludes:
Therefore, though they are always legitimate and are
occasionally extraordinarily fruitful, questions about
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retinal imprints or about the consequences of 
particular laboratory manipulations presuppose a world 
already perceptually and conceptually subdivided in a 
certain way. in a sense such questions are a part of 
normal science, for they depend upon the existence of a 
paradigm and they receive different answers as a result 
of paradigm change. [6.]
Like Kuhn and other modern philosophers of science, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty has questioned traditional conceptions concerning 
the neutrality of sense data. But unlike other philosophers, 
Merleau-Ponty has argued that the very concept of sense data is 
an invention, having no basis in our actual perception of the 
world. In ibs Ph&DDmenoiogy af EaiÆepLlany an early 
philosophical work, he points out that according to various 
authors pure sensation "corresponds to nothing in our 
experience."[71 Nevertheless, science still speaks as if there 
are pure sensations hidden somewhere beneath our more organized, 
"theory-laden” perceptions. These pure sensations are most 
often characterized as a flux upon which we impose various 
paradigms which organize that flux into our conscious 
perceptions. Merleau-Ponty's critique of this philosophical
doctrine rests upon his analysis of, among other phenomenon, the 
foreground-background phenomenon in perception. He argues that 
before any paradigm can ever be used to interpret our 
sensations, these sensations are already organized in a 
figure-background field.[8] Further, this field already is 
imbued with significance before any theoretical interpretation 
has been added.
We observe at once that it is impossible, as has often 
been said, to decompose a perception, to make it into a 
collection of sensations, because in it the whole is 
prior to the parts— and this whole is not an ideal
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whole. The meaning which I ultimately discover is not 
of the conceptual order. If it were a concept, the 
question would be how I can recognize it in the sense 
data, and it would be necessary for me to interpose 
between the concept and the sense data certain 
intermediaries, and so on. It is necessary that 
meaning and signs, the form and matter of perception, 
be related from the beginning and that, as we say, the 
matter of perception be "pregnant with its form."[91
Even in their most primitive state our perceptions are not
without significance. Likewise, our concepts are never without
a perceptual component. To speak of a pure concept or a pure
sensation makes no sense. "The pure sensations would amount to
no sensation and thus to not feeling at all."[10] Merleau-Ponty
criticizes theories that make use of pure sensations, saying
that they reflect "the experience error, which means that what
we know to be in things themselves we immediately take as being
in our consciousness of them. We make perception out of things
perceived.*[11] The result of this error is that we describe a
world in which objects have lost their primordial richness as we
experience them in our immediate perceptions of them.
The theory of sensation, which builds up all knowledge 
out of determinate qualities, offers us objects purged 
of all ambiguity pure and absolute, the ideal rather
than the real themes of knowledge: in short, it is
compatible only with the lately developed 
superstructure of consciousness. That is where "the
idea of sensation is approximately realized."[12]
This "lately developed superstructure” is roughly equal to
Kuhn's paradigmatic science. Given this view, it should not
surprise us when Merleau-Ponty states later in his career that .
Scientific thinking, a thinking which looks on from 
above, and thinks of the object-in-general, must return 
to the "there is" which underlies it; to the site, the 
soil of the sensible and opened world such as it is in 
our life and for our body— not that possible body which 
we may legitimately think of as an information machine.
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but the actual body I call mine, this sentinel standing 
quietly at the command of my words and my acts.[13]
Merleau-Ponty is not suggesting that science should
renounce its project, but he is suggesting that science should
begin to appreciate the incompleteness of its own powers of
description. Our lived world is not simply "the object x of our
operations," as envisioned by our paradigmatic model of it.[14]
There is also "another world" which, so to speak, "supplies"
science with the object x of its operations, but which science
has chosen to discount because of it inconstancy, this
primitive, phenomenal world where wax is at one moment a dull
malleable lump, then a shimmering puddle, this world where the
observer cannot draw a firm line between himself and the thing
observed.
Let us be more explicit. The sentient and the sensible 
do not stand in relation to each other as two mutually 
external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of the 
sentient by the sensible. It is my gaze which subtends 
colour, and the movement of my hand which subtends the 
object's form, or rather my gaze pairs off with colour, 
and my hand with hardness and softness, and in this 
transaction between the subject of sensation and the 
sensible it cannot be held that one acts while the 
other suffers the action, or that one confers 
significance on the other. Apart from the probing of 
my eye or my hand, and before my body synchronizes with 
it, the sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning.[15]
Before we can become scientists who fasten this gaze upon 
things to search out their boundaries and to explain their 
appearance, that world in which things and ourselves exist must 
be revealed to us. The revelation of this world comes in the 
gaze where the perceptual field arises that bestows significance 
upon the observer and the observed. Thus, neither things nor
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myself are anterior to perception. Rather, we both arise out of 
a perceptual field that is in Merleau-Ponty*s terms
"pre-personal,"[16] This pre-personal perceptual field to which 
all things and all thoughts are subordinated is not simply a 
muddle in which "I confuse causal thinking and reflection."[17] 
Rather, the perceptual field expresses the relation by which "I 
am able, being connatural with the world, to discover a sense in 
certain aspects of being without having myself endowed them with 
it through my constituting operation."[18]
But if neither things nor ourselves are anterior to
perception, then we must conclude that we are ourselves, not
through the transparency of a constituting thought, which could
only think things by making them its own consciousness, but
rather by virtue of our bodies, which gives rise to an enigma.
The enigma is that my body simultaneously sees and is
seen...It is not a self through transparence, like
thought, which only thinks its object by assimilating 
it, by constituting it, by transforming it into 
thought. It is a self through confusion, narcissism, 
through inherence of the one who sees in that which he 
sees, and through inherence of sensing in the sensed— a 
self, that is caught up in things, that has front and 
back, past and future...[19]
As selves we see— we look out upon the world and behold it
before us. But at the same time we can see our own body, which
is in fact seeing. We experience an outside and inside to our
seeing which are inseparable. Further, we inhabit the things
upon which we gaze. Our vision is not locked within our eyes or
our skulls; it penetrates the space around us, bringing us out
among the things it discovers. Thus, there is an inherence.
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even a confusion, of these two spheres. The self, as a body 
that sees itself out among things, experiences a brotherhood 
with things other than itself. "Things are an annex or
prolongation of itself; they are incrusted into its flesh, they 
are part of its full definition; the world is made of the same 
stuff as the body.”[20]
But if science is ignorant of this enigma, this "fabric of 
brute meaning" still inhabits the artist's vision. "Only the 
painter is entitled to look at everything without being obliged 
to appraise what he sees."[21] Merleau-Ponty's theory of
perception implies that the artist may uncover the basis of 
vision in a manner that escapes scientific explanation. The 
remainder of this paper will attempt to understand precisely how 
art informs us of our vision. We will consider some general 
consequences of Merleau-Ponty*s view of perception in relation 
to a painter's vision of the world. Then we will review his 
objections to Descartes' theory of art as a representation of 
real things. Finally, we will consider the work of the painter, 
Vermeer, in relation to the problems we will have raised in the
preceding sections. Vermeer worked within a tradition where the
representationalist project was still active. If 
Merleau-Ponty's objections to such a tradition are to be valid, 
we must show precisely how Vermeer may remain within that 
tradition and still capture the primordial world of perception 
which Merleau-Ponty wishes to assert inhabits all art.
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Given the rich contusion between body and things, given the
miraculous system of exchanges which characterizes our
explorations of the world, Merleau-Ponty argues by analogy that
art is a natural outcome of our being-in-the-world.
Things have an internal equivalent in me; they arouse 
in me a carnal formula of their presence. Why 
shouldn't these [correspondences] in their turn give 
rise to some external visible shape in which anyone 
else would recognize those motifs which support his own 
inspection of the world?[22]
Merleau-Ponty does not want to argue that this motif is simply a
"faded copy" or a trick of representation which in turn is a
copy not even of the real thing but only of our second hand copy
of the thing as it exists in our mental image. This does not
constitute visibility for Merleau-Ponty. Visibility does not
divide itself into two parts, the thing seen and the seer.
Rather, visibility is an "enigma" in which
the idios kosmos opens by virtue of vision upon a 
koinos kosmos; in short, that the same thing is both 
out there in the world and here in the heart of 
vision— the same, or, if one prefers a similar thing, 
but according to an efficacious similarity which is the 
parent, the genesis, the metamorphosis of Being in his 
vision. It is the mountain itself which from out there 
makes itself seen by the painter; it is the mountain 
that he interrogates with his gaze.[23]
Vision is not something we construct in order to gain a 
world; instead, "it works in us without us." If vision were 
simply a construction or a representation of the diverse parts 
of the visual world, we should be able to draw a clear line 
between that world and ourselves. There would be the real 
things located, depending upon whether you are an idealist or an
empiricist, "out there," or else >within our own mental
% .
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processes. And there would be a boundary between these two 
domains such that one set of entities would be representations 
of the other. Thus, vision would exist as a sort of indifferent 
commerce between the real and the representational pole. The 
representational painter, asking of vision to unveil its means, 
will search for a series of techniques or tricks with which to 
render copies, that is, representations, of the "real" thing. 
The ontic status of these representations would be secondary. 
They are not after all real, but copies of the real. They give 
us an illusion. The ideal of representational art becomes to 
give us an illusion of the real.
But, Merleau-Ponty does not depict such a model of vision.
Instead he finds that vision confuses the line between self and
thing, between seer and seen. This confusion (not only of
vision but of all senses) gives us both ourselves and the world
and both within the same birth. Vision precedes the world and
the self; without vision there could not be a world or self.
Thus, the question we ask of vision
is not a question asked of someone who doesn't know by 
someone who does— the schoolmaster's question. The 
question comes from one who does not know, and it is 
addressed to a vision, a seeing, which knows everything 
and which we do not make, for it makes itself in 
us.[24]
Vision is "pre-reflective." It gives us ourselves and our 
world before v/e can ever begin to think of them. This 
pre-reflective vision unites us with the world confusedly. 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of an "inspiration and expiration of Being" 
in vision that is "so slightly discernable that it becomes
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impossible to distinguish between what sees and is seen." [25]
Klee, a painter Merleau-Ponty admires, reports that
In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was 
not I who looked at the forest. Some days, I felt that 
the trees were looking at me, were speaking to me...I 
was there, listening...1 think that the painter must be 
penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate 
it...I expect to be inwardly submerged, buried. 
Perhaps I paint to break out.[26]
Here we confront the inverse of the operationalism of
science. The painter, the seer, must be penetrated by what he 
sees rather than penetrating it. Implicit in the ontology of
operationalism is the desire to penetrate things, that is to 
measure and to hold them in my consciousness as determinate 
entities. Consciousness becomes a purifying crucible in which 
the protean existence of things is rendered away, leaving a 
clarified consciousness of what things are. Such a model
implies a consistent ontological boundary between the knower and 
the known so that the knower may "disenworld" things in the 
interest of a determinate clarity. But the painter questions 
vision to discover a location of being where this ontological 
line dissolves. He finds it is impossible to say who sees and 
who is seen. Thus, "painting celebrates no other enigma but
that of visibility."[27] The painter practices "a magical theory 
of vision:"
He is obliged to admit that objects before him pass
into him or else that according to Malebrache's 
sarcastic dilemma, the mind goes out through the eyes
to wander among objects; for the painter never ceases 
adjusting his clairvoyance to them.[28]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 10
The image that the painter retrieves is indeed problematic. 
It is, as the vision that births it, "prehuman" and 
"pre-reflective." Merleau-Ponty speaks of Roualt's portrait of a 
long dead king which is "there as itself, as that which was 
always most alive about it."[29] The image refuses the reduction 
to a representational mode: this is exactly what makes it art.
It does not serve as a model of a moment of vision— rather in 
some mysterious fashion it is a moment of vision.
In contrast to his own description of vision, Merleau-Ponty 
turns to Descartes' analysis of vision in the Dioptric, a 
treatise written to explain how certain "artificial organs" can 
be fashioned to correct bad vision.
The heart of Merleau-Ponty's objection to the Dioptric lies 
in Descartes' reduction of vision to a causal, sense-data model 
of vision in which we no longer consider the vision we 
experience, the primordial inherence of things and the body in 
one another. Instead we substitute a conceptual explanation of 
what supposedly happens when we see, an explanation that places 
a model of vision-as-thinking between a pure self and its bodily 
sense data. For example, according to Merleau-Ponty's analysis 
of vision, the mirror is a product of the confusion between seen 
and seeing: when we stare into the mirror our body invades its
image; we are not located simply where the physiological 
process of seeing might be said to occur. We are also there
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before ourselves. Descartes' analysis of vision reduces this
phenomenon to a class of things that are simply "effects like a
ball's bouncing. If the reflection resembles the thing itself,
it is because this reflection acts upon the eyes more or less as
a thing would."[30] We confront in the mirror an image that is a
faded copy, a representation of our body, and not a reflexivity
of ourselves. The bind between the reflection and the onlooker
is causal— the haphazard conjunction of lightwaves and a
reflective surface make the thing before me in the mirror, which
is not really "me" at all, but simply a correspondence of
lightwaves ordered on a point by point basis.
A cartesian does not see himself in the mirror; he
sees a dunmiy, an "outside," which, he has every reason
to believe, other people see in the very same way but
which, no more for himself than for others, is not a
body in the flesh. The mirror image is nothing that
belongs to him.[31]
This analysis of vision places its processes within a 
causal web of determinations which reduces the resulting images' 
efficacity to one of representation. The richer notion of
resemblance, which moves painters to gaze with fascination at 
things, becomes an illusion. We do not see anything real on a 
piece of paper; rather we perceive a series of marks which 
"represent" matter extended in space. These marks, as Descartes 
himself notes, "excite our thought to conceive," as do signs and 
words "which in no way resemble the things they signify."[32] 
The drawing becomes the means whereby the thought of such and 
such an image is "occasioned." Vision becomes a code which 
carries a message but not the Being of the perceived object of
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which it is the message.
The magic of intentional species— the old idea of 
effective resemblance as suggested by mirrors and 
paintings— loses its final argument if the entire 
potency of a painting is that of a text to be read, a 
text totally free of promiscuity between the seeing and 
the seen,[33]
Descartes' analysis of vision cannot account for the
experience of Paul Klee, Things could never look at us. Sight
does not even bring them into me. These trees are simply sense
data that have come into my possession through my eyes. We no
longer can speak of the vision we experience. We speak instead
of a model of vision. These other experiences of vision, these
"occult operations" together with the "potions and idols they
concoct" are nothing but affective responses. Even color cannot
be really out there. Rather we associate or invent a certain
feeling to go with a certain face that appears before us. The
pleasure we draw from such icons is no longer of ontological
importance, but becomes a contingent, subjective, ontic
response. Painting's power will
make us see in the same way in which we actually see 
the thing itself, even though the thing is absent. 
Especially it makes us see a space where there is none.
The picture is a flat thing contriving to give us what 
we would see in the (actual) presence of "diversely 
contoured" things,,,[34]
Painting's purpose becomes to trick its beholder's eye into
seeing something is there when it really isn't.
This is precisely where Descartes' analysis disintegrates. 
The history of painting demonstrates that there is no single 
given technique which can render faithfully exactly the way
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things in space are perceived. Even linear perspective is not 
without ambiguity since it opens up several approaches to 
painting.
Thus plane projection does not always provoke our 
thought to reach the true form of things, as Descartes 
believed...Something in space escapes our attempts to 
look at it from "above."[35]
Space is not a homogeneous, self-contained container of all
other things. To experience space is to be in it. We cannot
get outside it to determine its absolute nature. Thus, the
problem of perspective is always the problem of how one man sees
individual things in relation to other things. His vision forms
a field in which space bends and warps in relation to what is
expected by the seer, and in what context the thing seen is
found.
The thing in space is not simply a stimulus for seeing. It 
is part of a field of vision. Likewise, "no symbolic form 
(within a painting) ever functions as a stimulus. Wherever it 
has been put to work and has acted, it has been put to work and 
has acted within the entire context of the oeuvre, and not in 
the slightest by means of a trompe I'oeil."f36]
This is not to deny the existence of lightwaves or 
electrical impulses in the nervous system. But it is to deny 
that these stimuli to our perception of a painting suffice to 
explain our vision of that painting. The oeuvre itself is seen 
as a context, ê û  totum. before any of its pieces are identified 
as this square stool or that blue eye. We do not see object x 
as its selfsubsistent identity, then object y , then the space
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between them, and then add these three disparate elements 
together to find a relationship between the two objects in
space. A theory which postulated pure sensation would find it 
necessary to compose an object from its various bits of sense 
impressions. We would list various discriminating features of 
an object, and when we reached a threshold where the features 
distinguished this object from every other object, we would then 
be able to see what it is. A sense-data theory of vision would 
be necessarily additive in nature, since the various stimuli 
must be combined into a co-ordinated and comprehensive totality.
A sense-data theory of vision will place the problem of
identity before that of resemblance. Before two things can be 
part of a larger whole, we roust identify them so that we know 
how they fit into that larger whole, and, indeed, what that 
larger whole presents itself as. Wallace Stevens remarks that 
"both in nature and in metaphor, identity is the vanishing point 
of resemblance."(37] When things are exactly what they are 
understood as, they loose their ability to be part of other 
things.
The proliferation of resemblances extends an object.
The point at which this process begins, or rather at 
which this growth begins, is the point at which 
ambiguity has been reached. The ambiguity that is so 
favorable to the poetic mind is precisely the ambiguity 
favorable to resemblance. In this ambiguity, the 
intensification of reality by resemblance increases 
realization.(38J
Stevens, like Herleau-Ponty, finds a more basic structure 
to our world than identity. Stevens speaks of the "resemblances 
between things as one of the significant components of the
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structure of reality. "it binds together. It is the base of 
appearance."[39] As in the case of Merleau-Ponty, Stevens' 
argument for signification within the world is dia-critical
rather than determinate, if things were simply determinate,
insofar as they are what they are, they could be nothing else. 
But objects can resemble one another because their meaning is
not simply in their disimilarity from all other objects.
Rather, the object is dissimilar within a context of discovered 
and undiscovered similarities. The language of painting 
explores this similarity between things. But in order to 
explore things at all, they must be put in a context of other
things. Their significance is not in and of themselves, but
comes from their relation with the whole fabric of our vision. 
Another way of putting this is to say that an individual thing
is not a thing at all. It is only because it marks itself as a
divergence from other things, as a specialization of our total 
field of vision, that it can ever exist for us. Thus, the 
technique of a painter is not to render each thing as it appears 
in and of itself in a space that is homogeneous emptiness. 
Instead, the technique of the painter presents a style of seeing 
things; it presents us with a context within which things 
become themselves. Space is not a fixed and determinate 
construction any more than objects are. "Something in space 
escapes our attempt to look on it from above."[40] If there are 
not determinate things, and if there is not a determinate space, 
then the statement that "the language of painting is never 
instituted by n a t u r e . [41] becomes understandable. Nature
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does not present us with a finished space filled with finished 
things for which we must simply find the appropriate technique 
to render them as if they were before us, even if they are not. 
Rather, painting's language is to "made and remade over and over 
again. The perspective of the Renaissance is no infallible 
gimmick."[42]
Like spoken and written language, the stylistic language of 
the painting is diacritical.[43] And, as in language,"It is the 
lateral relations of one sign to another which makes each of 
them significant, so that meaning appears only at the 
intersection of and as it were in the interval between 
words."[44]
If Merleau-Ponty is correct, that is, if it is true that a
painting embodies a system of correspondences, a network of
visual correlations which bind themselves together through the
dynamic of a pre-figuring whole and which are not reducible to a
conceptual construct of that whole, if it is true that any
attempt to fix space as absolute and outside of our primordial
vision is doomed to a reduction of vision to representation,
what then are we to say of classical painting in its figurative
and perspectival incarnations? Certainly, as Merleau-Ponty
himself has noted
Classical painting cannot be defined by its 
representations of nature or by its reference to "our 
senses."[45]
If the classical painter were simply to put down the "apparent
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size of each object" in a mathematical formulation that 
"transfers...measurements onto paper," then we end up
constructing "representations, in which each thing ceases to
call the whole of vision to itself, makes concessions to other 
things and no longer occupies on the paper any more than the 
space which they leave to it,"[46] Merleau-Ponty terms this act 
a "renouncement of the world" which abandons primordial vision 
by fixing it absolutely within the strait-jacket of a heavily 
perspectival technique, in which "I think of and dominate my 
vision as God can when he consider his idea of me."[47]
Jan Vermeer of Delft was a painter firmly rooted in the
classical tradition of representational painting. Many experts
have concluded that he made use of a earnera-obscura.[48] But
even if they are mistaken, there is no dispute that his pictures
are permeated with a precise, at times stunning rendering of
space that is blatantly perspectival. Laurence Cowing finds a
"god-like detachment" in this accomplishment.
His pictures are so invariably and completely 
convincing, they abstain so entirely from the 
suggestion of any other purpose, that at times we 
wonder whether the intention is not actually to deceive 
us. The record is so inflexibly impartial, so 
unchallengeable and perfect, that it is on the point of 
becoming a counterfeit. It is indeed only in painting 
which openly pursues this purpose, the painting of 
trompe I'oeil. at first sight the extreme opposite of 
the stylistic refinement which we associate with 
Vermeer's name, that such unremitting closeness to 
appearance is elsewhere to be found.[49]
Descartes' analysis of vision seems to explain most 
accurately the visual world of Vermeer's canvases. Vermeer 
catches things "cold" in his gaze, a gaze which is not the
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primordial gaze of Kerleau-Ponty, but a highly developed, 
theory-laden gaze in which geometric perspective maps out the 
exact placement of each object within the painting. Things give 
us the impression that they are "almost real." We find here the 
same ideal as that of Descartes; the paintings counterfeit 
space and its contents to create a model of the world frozen in
a single moment. Must we conclude that these paintings deny our
primordial vision, that they give us a world in which we are cut 
off from things and in which the gaze no longer is in the things 
it sees?
Yet Cowing concludes that Vermeer's works are finally
opposed to giving us a counterfeit of things.
For him (Vermeer) the play of light upon form not only
conveys its substance, but also subtly denies it. The
illusion which he seeks is not closeness but
distance...There is in his thought the paradoxical 
accompaniment of its clarity, a deep character of 
evasiveness, a perpetual withdrawal...The very 
closeness of his approach to a pure visual standard of 
representation was in fact the vessel in which he 
contained a strange depth of emotion, a complex pattern 
of feeling in which the attraction of the tangible 
world and a rejection of it were at last 
reconciled.[50]
Vermeer presents an interesting paradox; the space of his
paintings is strongly perspectival and yet this space becomes
the vessel by which a complex withdrawal from the tangible,
determinate world of things is achieved. While Herleau-Ponty's
analysis of vision would not necessarily preclude such a
phenomenon, neither does it present a detailed case for its
possiblity. As he points out.
Classical painting wants to be as convincing as things 
and does not think that it can reach us except as 
things do— by imposing an unimpeachable spectacle upon
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our senses. It relies in principle upon the perceptual 
apparatus, considered as a natural means and as a datum 
of communication between men. Don't we all have eyes 
which function more or less in the same way? And if 
the painter has known how to discover the sufficient 
signs of depth or velvet, won't we all, in looking at 
the painting see the same spectacle, which will rival 
that of Nature?[51]
Yet, Merleau-Ponty does not wish to deny the power of classical
painting. Thus, he asserts that there must be another force at
work in classical painting, perhaps unconsciously, that suffices
to bring about in the place of simple representation "that
metamorphosis which painting later became aware of."[52] Cowing
finds hints in Vermeer's works of exactly such a metamorphosis.
In the concluding section of this paper I will consider the work
of Vermeer to determine how it is that he transcends the
implications of perspectival technique and remains true to a
primordial sense of vision.
Vermeer, like any painter of the seventeenth century, 
inherited a tradition of painting that was heavily perspectival 
in nature. Caravaggio's influence had moved painting towards 
naturalism. Painters were beginning to produce still lifes and 
genre paintings inspired by everyday occurences and imbued with 
recognizable and profane human emotions. The art work was being 
weaned away from its overwhelmingly sublime and religious 
sensiblity. This is particularly an accomplishment of the 
Protestant north during the Baroque era. The genre scene to 
which Vermeer confines himself in most of his paintings was also
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a product of a rising middle class in Holland which desired an 
art that would complement the interiors of their homes. This 
was an art no longer made for churches; it hung in dining rooms 
or even in the nooks of blacksmith shops.[53]
Yet, Vermeer made his own living selling other men's art. 
Most of his canvases were still in his possession at his death. 
And while he had inherited the genre scene as a convention, he 
painted it as an intimate mediation rather than as a commercial 
venture. His canvases are obsessive: they return to the same
room, the same themes again and again, reworking their 
relationships, adjusting their outcomes. This personal dynamic 
radically altered the nature of the genre painting produced by 
Vermeer: these are no longer sensuous or dramatic renderings of
everyday Dutch households, but rather slices of time enveloped 
in an intense stillness, infused with diacritical tensions. His 
paintings, in spite of their everyday settings, did not reflect 
the off-handedness nor the moral didacticism that characterized 
many of the Dutch genre painters.[54j
One theme that stands out in particular within his works is 
the gaze. In his early paintings men gaze upon women in highly 
ambivalent contexts. Sometimes the gaze is pictured from 
behind; we see the large form of a soldier turned towards a 
woman at a table, but the gaze of the soldier is hidden from our 
view.[55] There is always an implied criticism of such gazes: 
they seem to capture insufficiently tlie women upon whom they 
alight. Edward A. Snow explores the gaze of a male suitor in
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'Woman Drinking with a Gentleman":
Hat and cloak work to reduce the wearer to scarcely 
more than his look— a distant, hovering regard. The 
distance measured by this masculine gaze is the most
negatively rendered one in all of Vermeer (the cloak
forms a bridge from his eyes to her hand that seems 
calculated to offend perception), Regardless of what 
motivates it, it is depicted as something that 
objectifies, condescends and demeans. The gentleman's 
lips curls upward into an expression that threatens to 
read as distaste or amused contempt instead of 
admiration...(56]
Buried in these portrayals of gazes is Vermeer's deeper 
complaint: his own gaze. Vermeer's gaze is in one sense the
perfect gaze of the arch-representationalist. His gaze is
comprehensive in regard to things. Yet, Vermeer's gaze roust 
ultimately be measured by the same standard which measures the 
gaze of the suitor in "Woman Drinking with a Gentleman." The 
suitor's gaze dehumanizes its object. It "objectifies." This is 
precisely the effect of Vermeer's perspectival gaze. It draws 
the woman into the space of the painting as a thing; its puts 
her body before us, fully determinate in its presence.
Yet Vermeer's paintings finally escape the effects of the
objectifying gaze even as they continue to employ a perspectival
technique. We first encounter the terms of this escape in the
Dresden "Letter Reader." The figure is oblivious to our
inspection of her. It is as if we have come into room
stealthily or accidently. In front of us Vermeer piles
curtains, bed spreads and fruit in a tense and thick
conglomeration of things past which we must fight to see "her."
She makes no appeal; she claims no place in the
tangible world. The whole purpose is to exclude her 
from it, from the world of touch, of magnetic
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attraction, to confine her with the envelope of
space...The delicacy of Vermeer's approach to figure 
painting, his cautious advance upon humanity down the 
measured, fortified field of his perspective suggests 
an element in his attitude of something like fear. The 
caution, the tentativeness with which he approaches the 
"Letter Reader"...reveals the enigmatic significance 
that he attaches to her.[571
This painting no longer pictures one person (usually male) 
observing another (usually female). Rather, the painting iS. the 
gaze of the painter as he comes upon this figure almost
accidently. She does not gaze back. Yet we sense a diffidence 
in his gaze as it approaches her form. She stands in front of
us, unaware, silent and passive. She is like a thing, and yet
not a thing at all. But Vermeer proceeds to render her amidst 
these other things as a thing. This is the only solution that 
his perspectival technique allows. She is, after all, a body, 
and a body is a thing. But she is not just a thing. A body is
also a consciousness of the world. Thus, Vermeer's diffidence.
To paint the body as a thing is to lose the body's presence as 
an other's gaze. We sense that Vermeer must be struggling with 
his own gaze, trying to put "her" there before us without 
violating her own integrity. Thus, Vermeer paints a tension 
between visual and tactile qualities. Vermeer fights the 
implications of his technique even as he pushes that technique 
to its greatest achievement. This diacritical tension is 
precisely the sort of metamorphosis that Merleau-Ponty predicts 
must occur in the classical tradition. This metamorphosis 
haunts the work of Vermeer.
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As Vermeer paints his exact and clearly articulated space, 
he disturbs this articulation with an in-pouring of light from a 
single window. This light mysteriously disintegrates the 
solidity and fixedness of the various objects in the room. This 
light is not essentially shadow; it is essentially color. It 
does not define lines on the figure by contrasting shadings. 
Instead, the colors shift in nuances creating a vibratory 
dissonance that imperceptibly shatters the linear qualities of 
his figures. It is as if Descartes, who also experimented with 
the camera obscura, began to bathe himself in the mysterious 
virtuosity of color, that inconstant, mutant aspect of vision 
which he entirely ignores within the Dioptric . In Vermeer's 
rooms, even as space becomes fixed, light interrupts this 
process with its ov/n ambiguous declaration of being. In 
"Allegory of the Hew Testament," Vermeer dampens this enthusiasm 
for light. The effect is disastrous. The figure of this 
painting is drab and lifeless. It is fixed in space, 
articulate, and yet it fails to arouse our wonder. And in an 
"Artist in His Studio" Vermeer gently satirizes this artist who 
paints the garland on top of a model's head. The garland that 
we see on the real model melts into light. The painter's 
beginning statement of this garland is naturally flat. It does 
not contain, at least yet, the nuances of light that will 
recreate Vermeer's wonderful light. Vermeer seems to ask, "Will 
he see it"? The fact that he has dressed his model as a rather 
unimaginative personification of history hints that he probably 
will not. Luckily Vermeer does observe this "marriage of
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light," as Cowing has described it, with the precisely
articulated world of perspectival painting.
In the window of the Dresden "Letter Reader" we return to
the mystery of light. We see her face, broken up and flattened,
cubist in its implications. The wonder of this mirrored face is 
its play of seeing with seen. We sense here the primal unity of
things and consciousness in perception. And there is a further
implication. If the window were to drift slightly shut, it 
would come to rest upon the gazer's face, this painter who would 
then confront his ov/n seeing in light.
Most critics agree that Vermeer's dialectical explorations
of visibility were most dramatically resolved in the "Head of a
Young Girl." Here v/e observe the same disintegrating play of
light against the tactile qualities of her form. But now a gaze
confronts us. She has caught us even before we look. We cannot
simply inspect her. And neither can v/e possess our vision of
her. Her eyes haunt our seeing of her until we feel that the
painting itself is looking at us, possessing us.
Faced with an expression that seems always to have 
already elicited our response, that not only seeks out 
but appropriates and inhabits our gaze, we can scarcely 
separate what is visible on the canvas from what
happens inside us as v/e look at it. Indeed it seems
the essence of the image is to subvert the distance 
between seeing and feeling, to deny the whole 
vocabulary of "objective" and "subjective."[58]
The final accomplishment of Vermeer's paintings is that they
introduce in our confrontation with them the same problem which
inspired them. Our gaze is questioned. Like the painter we are
put before a space in which other gazes, other beings reside.
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And like the painter we must interrogate the means by which 
these beings can come within ourselves. We sense an appeal in 
this work to a mystery: within our gaze there is a confusion of 
who we are with what we see. Even the most precise attempt to 
render the determinate geometry of space cannot escape the 
ambiguity of this essential foundation to our vision and by 
implication to our own consciousness. For the painter the gaze 
is the labyrinth of the world's being. There is no final thread 
by which to discover its exterior.
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POETIC LANGUAGE AND THE SPEAKING OF THE SELF
When the self demands its own uncovering, it does not 
demand it during "the leisure of a blue day." The realization 
that I do not know who I am is frightening. It plunges me into 
a yet uncharted abyss of my existence where it seems I must 
learn again myself or disappear. Hov/ is it possible that I can 
come to say that I do not know who I am? Certainly I know that 
I have a past, and certainly it is myself who moves these
fingers across the keys of this typewriter while the world 
around me blooms incessantly. I stop and speak this question.
I say, "Who am I?". Already, this earth is at my disposal, 
whether I wish it or not, whose tastes rest upon my tongue, 
whose creatures graze against my flesh, whose language embodies 
my desires, my opinions and even my insistent question.
Still, I am unsatisfied. It is not enough that there be a
world. I sense however indistinctly a need to locate my 
existence. I am not these storms of light, no matter how 
awesome, that flood through the window, nor the words that I 
have used to say this sentence. All of these things are thrown 
into me or thrown away from me, but they are not what I might 
call myself.
I find everywhere around me evidence that my own self has 
existed. There is the music that I play upon a piano, or the 
love that I give a v/oman. These accomplishments seem to have 
journeyed out of myself and into the world in order to coagulate
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that indistinct wound of the self that I cannot find. Can I not 
grasp hold of myself through these accomplishments in this world 
hovering about me? My actions, my products, ray words show my 
presence. But, as Sartre has noted, each of these enworldments
of my self fails to hold the self that has done them. Once the
self has acted, putting itself into something "out there," the 
self finds itself outside itself in the determinate form of that 
something, I can attempt to possess this uncovering of myself, 
but eventually I will fail to recognize this enworldment, this 
enthinging of the self, as my self. The "who" that I am is not 
caught in this object or even in these others living around me. 
These appearances of my self mysteriously escape my project. In 
them a sort of self appears before me, but my indistinctness
continues,[1]
Sartre argues that my consciousness, my self, does not
possess being; it is a nothingness. Perhaps I am in bad faith, 
but I rebel against this conclusion. Yet, the problem that
Sartre describes remains with me. My self cannot be put before 
me. It escapes my attempts to materialize its substance as
something I can finally unravel and lay out before my
consciousness. It refuses to become an object of knowledge for 
me. How can my self be my self when it escapes ray knowledge of 
it?
But I cannot ask "Who am I?" as if I am asking "What is 
it?" "It" cannot be a self. To know myself as an "it" would be 
to treat myself as if I were a determinate object of knowledge
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that could be abstracted from my act of knowing. The self 
becomes an object of knowledge before the self. This object of 
knowledge could be a physical object or a meta-physical object, 
but in either case this object serves as a sort of encapsulation 
of the self for the self. This self that we seek to know as an 
"it" is fixed and inert. This "it," this object of knowledge 
answers a different question. "It" appears when I say "What am 
I?".
Gabriel Marcel discusses this phenomenon. He terms the 
attempt to specify "what" something is as "characterization," 
which
implies a certain setting of myself in front of the 
other, and a sort of radical banishment or cutting-off 
of me from it. I myself bring about this banishment, 
by myself implicitly coming to a halt, separating 
myself as a thing bounded by its outlines. It is only 
in relation to this implicitly limited thing that I 
can place whatever I am trying to characterize.(2J
Marcel calls such characterization a sort of possession "of that
which cannot be possessed."(3J
Gilbert Ryle develops a different sort of critique of the
same problem. He contends that the attempt to posit mental
phenomenon such as the self, as if they were things of which we
can have conscious knowledge, builds a fantasy world of
metaphysical objects which mirrors in its dynamics the normal
occurrences of the material world.
The differences between the physical and the mental 
are thus represented as differences inside the common 
framework of the categories of 'thing', 'stuff, 
'attribute', 'state', 'process', 'change', 'cause' and 
'effect.' Minds are things but different sorts of 
things from bodies; mental processes are causes and 
effects, but different sorts of causes and effects
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from bodily movements.[4]
Both Ryle and Marcel attempt to move away from a conception 
of the self as a "para-thing," I am in sympathy with this move.
But if I am not a thing, why might I feel inevitably drawn 
to a mirror when I question the possibility of the uncovering of 
my self? Is not this image just another product, another thing 
set before me? It is "out there." I am "in here" in my seeing. 
This image puts itself before me, like a mechanical dummy, the 
inevitable result of haphazard light waves that strike my body, 
then the mirror and then enter my eyes which record these waves 
as "data" and present it to this "self" whom I question so 
incessantly.
But I cannot remain indifferent before this figure. If it
seems ugly to me, I wince. Sometimes it will seem frail and 
lost. Other times its eyes are filled with anger, A Cartesian 
might charge I am commiting a pathetic fallacy, I am projecting 
what I myself feel into what I see before me. But what I see in 
this mirror sometimes startles me with feelings I had not yet 
discovered. It uncovers me in that face that stares vaguely
distrustful and yet in wonder at an entity "out there" that is
not just any entity, but is my face.
This mirror suggests that I come to know about myself in my 
vision rather than apart from it. If I am to ask the question 
"Who am I?" in such a way that searches for some absolute dot 
which I might recognize as myself, I would be searching for a
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way to know that excludes the way perception knows things. In 
place of vision I would discover a v/ay of the self being present 
to itself that is absolute and unmediated. I look into the 
mirror and discover a stranger that I begin to suspect I call 
myself. That face with its thin lips, its blue eyes, its 
expression of puzzlement pulls at me, I cannot imagine not 
being pulled at by that face. If I were to stare at it 
indifferently, as if it were, a lump of coal, I would court the 
loss of the very self I wish to question. I can imagine a man 
who looks at his image as if it were an object. It does not 
seem strange to him because it does not remind him of himself. 
He has no reason to think it confronts his own familiarity with
the world. He simply looks at it. He does not see the
expression in the wrinkles at the fold of the mouth. He does 
not find himself startled at the luminescent eyes gazing into 
him. He simply observes an object before him,[5]
But I do not find an object in the mirror before me.
Rather, I find something that I can address both as "I" and as 
"you." This image mixes the world's being with my own. 
Inevitably I speak my question to this other self that is ray 
self: the question "Who am I?" in which is buried "Who are
you?"
Its answer is not always comforting. In The Notebooks of 
Malte Laurids Brigge, Rilke describes a scene in Malte's 
childhood when one day he put on a mask, swirled scarves around 
his body and searched out his image in the mirror. At first, he
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is fascinated. Then, after having overturned a small table 
holding a crystal bottle of perfume and some porcelain parrots, 
Malte discovers he cannot release himself from his own disguise. 
The garments cling only tighter as he pulls at the cords which 
bind them to his body. He rushes to the mirror to aid his 
undressing...
But for this the mirror had just been waiting. Its 
moment of retaliation had come. While I strove in
boundlessly increasing anguish to squeeze somehow out 
of my disguise, it forced me by what means I do not 
know, to lift my eyes and imposed on me an image, no a 
reality, a strange, unbelievable and monstrous 
reality, with which against ray will, I became 
permeated: for now the mirror was the stronger, and I
was the mirror. I stared at this great, terrifying 
unknown before me, and it seemed to me appalling to be 
alone with him. But at the very moment I thought 
this, the worst befell: I lost all sense, I simply
ceased to exist. For one second I had an 
indescribable, painful and futile longing for myself, 
then there was only he; there was nothing but he. I 
ran away, but now it was he that ran.[6]
We might see Malta's experience as a childlike example of 
Sartrean bad faith. He succumbs to the power of the mirror to
picture his existence in the world as a thing. Dut then, he
recognizes with terror the loss of what he had thought was his 
ov/n self in this strange self hovering in the mirror before him. 
He seemingly has confused the question "Who am I?" with "What am 
I?" and in the "What am I?" an abyss suddenly loomed that
swallowed up the self he had been accustomed to being. He was 
no longer little Malte playing in the attic of his parent's 
estate. Rather he was this image in the mirror, this terrible, 
unknown image which he had become between one breath and the 
next.
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In Sartre's view he was neither image. He was an abyss, a 
refusal to be any image. Unable to acknowledge this Sartrean 
self, Malte finds himself swallowed up in the "he" or "it" of 
the mirror. But it is not really the image in that mirror which 
disturbs him. It is that he is nothing that disturbs him so 
profoundly.
From another viewpoint the experience is even more 
frightening— yet wondrous. In my analysis of the mirror I have 
suggested that the self is mixed with the image it finds in the 
mirror. The self discovers itself as an expressive body put 
before itself. It is only because the self is there as a body 
before itself that it discovers the mirror pulling at itself. 
But the pull of the image of the mirror is also the pull of 
something beyond the self. The self discovers that as it says 
"Who am I?" to the image in the mirror, it also says "Who are 
you?" There is no splitting of these questions. One is implicit 
in the other. This "you" which I discover in the mirror is not 
simply a representation of "what" I am, nor even an 
acknowledgement of simply "who" I am. It is also the 
confrontation with a "you," an otherness that I am not. This 
otherness that I am not mixes with this self that I am. There 
is a sudden expiration of one self into the other. The self is 
utterly violated. It has become something other than itself, 
although not in bad faith as Sartre suggests. Rather, the self 
finds itself in the very odd position of being totally other to 
itself exactly as it is itself.
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This phenomenon is not limited to mirrors. Nor is it 
always so frightening. Let us consider again the question "Who 
am I?", Such a question is not asked knowingly of one who is 
unable to recognize the problem such a question poses. "Who am 
I?" can be asked only to one who might answer. If this 
respondent tells me "what" I am, rather than "who" I am, this 
answer will be as insufficient as my ovm answer to "what" I am. 
In this case I would simply know that this other self sees me as 
an "it," This is precisely what motivates Sartre's view that 
others cannot unveil myself to me. For Sartre the other can 
only know myself as an "it" which answers the question "What?"
Further, this other self to whom I direct my questions 
cannot be an "it." I do not direct my question "Who am I?" to 
one whom I suspect can only ask himself "What am I?". This self 
before me must be in the same quandary as myself. Within the 
question "Who am I?", "Who are you?" is inherent. The act of
asking the former question acknowledges a "you" to whom the 
question is inherently addressed. Even if the question is posed 
by myself to myself, the question is asked by an "I" to a "you." 
The self poses the question to itself as it listens at the same
moment to the matter which the question poses.
This second self listens to this question "Who am I?"
within which is buried "Who are you?". This listening, even 
before any answer might be given constitutes the basis of our 
acknowledgement for one another. In this questioning and this 
listening a certain power in language has been uncovered.
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Language brings two selves searching for their selves into a 
shared significance. We both understand that each has 
discovered the absence of his own self, and that the other self, 
listening before me, embodies that question as much as I do.
The language that brings the question "Who am I?" to the 
"you," whether that "you" is another self, or whether that "you" 
is the listening of our own selves to our selves, this language 
makes possible the first uncovering of the self that allowed the 
self to determine that it did not know itself or the other. 
There would be no question at all without language. There would 
be no struggle to uncover the self if the question "Who am I?" 
were not uttered no matter hov/ silently within the self, A self
as a possibility would not even be named. This fact implies
that between our demand to know and that which we seek to know 
is the mediation of language. Language arises within ourselves 
and between ourselves and other selves to mediate our entry into 
one another, and even our entry into ourselves. It is against 
this property of language that the asking of "Who am I?" gains 
its significance. Unlike "What is it?", our question demands 
that language be always with us. As in the case of my body set 
before me in the mirror, language does not set itself apart from 
myself in the question "Who am I?". Rather, I am my language.
This is not to say that I am language in every sense of
language. The remainder of this paper will be an attempt to
clarify exactly hov/ language and the self are related. The 
first step of my analysis will be an inspection of the problem
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of representational language. The second step will pose the 
possibility of another sort of language. To search out this 
language I will turn to the play. King Lear, by Shakespeare.
The search to uncover the self leads us inevitably to a 
consideration of the role of language in our struggle both to 
utter and to answer the insistent question, "Hkio am I?", At 
every moment language intertwines with our search, hinting at a 
mysterious pact between the self who poses this question and its 
language. And even if the self remains silent, this silence 
becomes language. Our silences reach out to our moments of 
speech in order to focus and to reveal more fully the location 
of our being, Cordelia's silence before her father. King Lear, 
in Shakespeare's play speaks far more eloquently and sincerely 
than her sisters' ornate rhetoric, Lear's inability to hear 
Cordelia's silence as language bears tragic results for both 
himself and Cordelia,
We are accustomed to thinking that language is essentially 
referential. From this viewpoint, our language gains its 
meaning from the objects or ideas to which it is associated or 
which it signifies. In its association with an entity, language 
gains its power to become synonymous with the definition of the 
entity. The word's power is not in itself, but is in the object 
or idea to which the word adheres for its significance. Like a 
plastic coating adhering to a painted board, the word assumes
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the form of the entity for which it is a sign. Language is a 
code, in which various entities are represented but which is 
totally meaningless in itself except that it can picture in a 
parallel fashion a real world. The word "cat" comes to mean cat 
only insofar as it is defined in relation to a real class of 
animals, whether this class is perceived or is simply our idea. 
Language becomes a tool in which the world is gridded and one 
object or idea is set off from another. Definitions serve as 
correspondence rules that attach the word in a consistent 
fashion either to things, to thoughts of things, or to our 
emotive responses.
Such conceptions of language have haunted philosophy. The
project of an ideal language, conceived by Leibniz and given a
more concrete form by Russell, searches for a language in which
each word will represent only one class of things. Thus, we
find Wittgenstein insisting in his early work that every
statement has a precise sense, and that every statement has this
precise sense because it is pictorial.
A factual proposition gets its precise sense only 
because its words either represent existing things or 
are analyzable into other words which represent 
existing things.[7]
Such a language ,once formulated, would be placed into a
parallel correspondence with a verified world to the point where
one would not even be able to say false things.
However, if we are to take seriously the self's question, 
"Who am I?", a representational language will be discarded, A 
representational language can only say that which can be
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 12
encoded, that which can be defined as if it had boundaries which 
could be pictured, and as if it were able to be put before us so 
that we could "picture" it within our language. But the self 
does not stand outside of itself, at least in this manner, and 
so the self experiences itself as an abyss. When we attempt to 
represent the self we "see" a darkness rather than a thing. The 
self resists encoding.
Further, the self's use of representational language will
be expressive in a rather narrow and determined manner. There
will be an inner meaning which the self holds as an idea or
perception . and to which the word gives an outer expression or
picture. Thus, language is attached to the self's thoughts,
like tags to invisible balloons in order to make these thoughts
public. We say that language represents these thoughts.
Merleau-Ponty has noted that "our analyses of thought gives us
the impression that before it finds the words which express it,
it is already a sort of ideal text that our sentences attempt to
translate."[8] Heidegger criticizes this conception of thought
in relation to language as a reductionism which ignores the
primordial power of language and especially of poetic language.
The idea of speech as an utterance is the most common.
It already presupposes the idea of something internal
that utters or externalizes itself. If we take 
language to be utterance, we give an external surface 
notion of it at the very moment when we explain it by 
recourse to something internal.[9J
If thoughts are to be "translated," they must be like 
things with distinct boundaries, so that they may be pictured 
precisely by language. These thoughts are like various atoms
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which the self holds in its consciousness like a bag of marbles,
taking out whichever one it may need and expressing it in
language so that other minds may also find the same marble 
through a process of decoding. The thoughts aggregate within 
the self, yet make no appreciable difference in the self who is 
inherently defined by such a view's implications as simply the 
capacity to hold these thoughts. Merleau-Ponty criticizes this 
view;
To make of language a means or a code for thought is 
to break it. when we do so we prohibit ourselves from 
understanding the depth to which words sound within 
us— from understanding that we have a need, a passion, 
for speaking and must (as soon as we think) speak to 
ourselves; that words have power to arouse thoughts 
and implant henceforth inalienable dimensions of 
thought; and that they put responses on our lips we
did not know we were capable of, teaching us, Sartre 
says, our own thought. If language duplicated 
externally a thought which in its solitude legislates 
for every other possible thought, it would not be, in 
Freud's terms, a total 'reinvestment' of our life. It 
would not be our element as water is the element of 
fishes. A parallel thought and expression would each 
have to be complete in its own order; the irruption 
of one into the other or the interception of one by 
the other would be inconceivable... Of course, the 
very system of language has its thinkable structure.
But when we speak we do not think about it as the 
linguist does; we do not even think about it— we 
think about what we are saying. It is not just that 
we cannot think of two things at a time. It would 
seem that in order to have something signified before 
us (whether at emission or reception), we must stop 
picturing its code or even its message to ourselves,
and make ourselves sheer operators of the spoken 
word.[10]
The self that is evoked by "Who am I?" is a self without 
fixed boundaries, without the power of standing before itself to 
be pictured to itself. Thus, the speaking of the answer to this 
question cannot be thought of as the speaking of a code or 
reference for something that is really the thing which this word
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simply stands for or signifies. Within the abyss of our 
searching for ourselves there is no thing for which the word may 
stand. We are left in silence, or within other modes of 
language that evoke in metaphor what many of us are likely to 
term the "unreal." From the viewpoint of representational 
language poetic language or silence stands for nothing that can 
be pictured before us in a precise fashion. Thus, when we are 
silent or when we speak poetically, our language is meaningless. 
While a representationalist will wish to rescue poetry by 
claiming it is simply representational language in a more 
arresting form (e.g. a metaphor is really a suppressed simile 
expressing a logical relation in the form of analogy), this 
reduction of poetry to representation implicitly unsettles the 
self who demands "who” and not "what."
We now can ask the central question of this paper. If the 
self is indeed not a bounded thing or concept that can be
encoded in language, can it then be said that there is no
language which will take in this elusive self, and thus, being
no language, can we then say there is no v/ay for that self to be
revealed in language? This would certainly be the argument of 
many thinkers. If evidence is to be construed as that which can 
be uttered as a representation of that which is, what have we 
here to represent? There is only an abyss.
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Shakespeare's play. King Lear. struggles with precisely 
this question. At the play's beginning King Lear demands of his 
daughters: "Which of you shall we say doth love us most..."[11]
The first and the second sister answer him in glowing terras, 
each attempting to outdo the other's words. Then Lear turns to 
Cordelia :
..what can you say to draw
A third more opulent than your sisters? Speak,
Cordelia: Nothing ray lord.
Lear: Nothing?
Cordelia: Nothing.
Lear: Nothing will come of nothing. Speak again.[12]
This answer enrages Lear. He understands Cordelia to be 
insolent, interpreting her silence as the refusal or inability 
of Cordelia to love him. He disdains the advice of Kent, his 
most trusted advisor, who says:
Thy youngest daughter does not love thee least.
Nor are those empty-hearted whose low sounds
Reverb no hollowness.[13]
Lear's questioning of his three daughters is not unlike the 
appeal "Who am I?". Yet what Lear expects is proof, evidence 
that he is loved, evidence that can be given only insofar as it 
can be represented to Lear. Likewise, Lear does not simply 
state his own love, but also wishes to give evidence of it by 
his award of his kingdom, now split into three parts, to his 
daughters. In return he expects that his daughters will prove 
by their words their love for him.
One might say that while attempting to ask "Who am I?", 
Lear blurted out "What am I?". His daughters' words are to 
serve as a representation of "what" he is. The more vigorous
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the claim of the language to represent that love, the greater 
must be the love of that daughter. This love gives Lear proof 
that he is what he believes himself to be: a powerful and
bénéficient father who loves his daughters generously and 
wisely. The image of Lear to himself is something that Lear 
sees as an "it." He seeks security in the possession of this 
"it" by demanding its representation from his daughters.
The speeches of Goneril and Reagan at the play's beginning 
stand in opposition to Cordelia's. Cordelia says "nothing"
while they attempt to say everything. Goneril states, "I love
you more than word can wield the matter."[14] The exaggeration 
of Goneril' speech bothers us. We suspect that nothing can be 
loved as much as she claims she loves Lear. But it is not
simply her grandiose claims that unsettles us. Goneril also
implies to Lear that her love, whether she really feels it or 
not, is readily apparent to herself. Her love does not seem 
dark or mysterious; she possesses it as one might possess a 
castle or a kingdom. This is precisely the sort of love for 
which Lear has been searching.
Further, while Goneril complains of language's 
shortcomings, they do not seem to affect her capacity for self 
knowledge. She seems able to be quite sure of her love, even 
though she cannot say it.
Her love exists in her like an organ for which she searches 
the right tag. Sadly, there are no "tags" worthy of it. This 
is because she contends her love is beyond any quantity; it is
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always "more than." But if her love escapes any quantification 
and thus cannot be represented, then how can she herself know 
surely that she loves Lear? If this love is within her like a 
bounded thing, then she could be sure of its possession. But 
she contends there is something about this love that is 
unrepresentable. It is not in her like a thing. Yet she
insists on acting as if she possesses it. Her claims contradict 
one another. Yet Lear’s desire for evidence of his own self 
blinds him to her hypocrisy. His initial assumption has been 
that language can represent love. This assumption now appears 
to have serious flaws.
Reagan's response reinforces this notion of language. She 
states after her sister's speech that "In my true heart/ I find 
she names my very deed of love/Only she comes too short." [15] 
Evidently her infinity of love is greater by an infinity than 
Goneril's.
Cordelia reacts to the implications of her sisters' 
speeches with dismay; "What shall Cordelia speak?"[16] Lear's 
question searches her more deeply than her sisters. She is not 
as sure of her love. It is not in her as an already completed 
thing which might be translated however imperfectly by means of 
rhetoric into an outward expression of inward sentiment. Her 
language cannot be the clothing of a pre-formed thought. Regan 
and Goneril criticize language because it inadequately 
represents their love. But for both of them language remains 
representational in its project. Cordelia's criticism of
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language is more profound. She rebels at the attempt to make a 
picture of her love, "Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave/My 
heart into my mouth."(17]
Cordelia's answer is ambiguous. It carries two senses, one 
of which is creative and one of which is destructive. In this 
latter sense Cordelia's "nothing" threatens to become impotent 
in its speaking. Her love weighs upon her "ponderously,” but 
her tongue cannot speak it. She seems troubled by the ease with 
which her sisters find and paint their love. Yet Cordelia's 
first answer, which says nothing beyond that she does love Lear, 
seems inadequate. Given this attitude towards language, love 
could be indicated but never shared. One will feel it darkly in 
one's heart; it will weigh upon one; but the tongue will 
remain unmoved, and in an important sense the love will remain 
unaccomplished. In the creative sense Cordelia's "nothing" is a 
genuine response. Unlike her sisters, she makes a serious 
although pessimistic attempt to show herself. Because of this, 
Cordelia's answer resonates beyond the failure of a 
representational project. She speaks her silence in this word. 
The speaking of this silence attempts to evoke rather than to 
represent for Lear the depth of her "ponderous" love. 
Cordelia's "nothing" calls out for further speech precisely 
because it startles Lear, undermining so profoundly his naive 
confidence in his language and in his self. The "nothing" 
refuses to be pictured in a representational speech. It calls 
out for a different sort of speaking.
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Cordelia insists upon answering to Lear the question "Who 
am I?" in place of "What am I?", Lear becomes enraged. This 
rage's severity can only be accounted for by the fact that Lear 
has demanded a representation of love because he has made the 
image of himself as a loving father-king equivalent to v;ho he 
is. But Lear is not an image of himself. Lear is Lear looking 
out upon the world. Cordelia's response is true to his richness 
of his self while it ignores his demand to be pictured. His 
denial of Cordelia's answer amounts to a blasphemy against his 
own self, because he refuses to acknowledge the depths of his 
self which cannot be represented. Cordelia's silence attempts 
to break down his false self so that she may share the 
significance of Lear with Lear.
Cordelia has intimately linked speech with morality and 
both of these with her own sense of self. "What shall Cordelia 
speak" is no idle question. She takes her speaking seriously 
precisely because it promises to mediate her love. Love might 
be discovered through speech rather than expressed by means of 
speech. Thus, Cordelia cannot be sure of her love for Lear. It 
is not a fact to be evidenced. Yet, her stubborn refusal to 
speak anything beyond "nothing" in a non-representational mode 
of speaking underminehis very possibility of Lear's discovery of 
her love. Sincere speech will discover its intention in its 
speaking. It will not manufacture language to reflect a 
preconceived and bounded love. But, when Lear pushes Cordelia 
to speak again, Cordelia equates love with duty;
You have begot me, bred me, loved me. I
Return those duties back as are right fit,[18]
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 20
With this statement Cordelia denies Lear's question, "Who am 
I?", as profoundly as her sisters. Cordelia is either reticent 
or unable to continue to speak in that mode of language that had 
begun to resonate in Cordelia's first answer. With this second 
response language slips back into a mode of representation. 
Cordelia's love no longer seems ponderous or strangely blind. 
Rather, her love becomes a duty, a logical outcome of certain 
biological and historical facts. Like her sisters she speaks of 
a love without wonder or darkness, its significance complete 
before it is ever spoken.
Lear's mistake is not that he asks concerning his 
daughters' love. Such a question promises a speaking that might 
uncover the self. Thus, Lear's expectation of an answer to his 
question is not inconsistent. But the insistent expectation 
that this love will be proven to him constitutes a tragic 
blindness. Cordelia's mistake is to find Lear's question 
without intrinsic merit. With her second answer she refuses the 
challenge to speak her love because she misunderstands the real 
question that Lear is asking. Cordelia's stubbornness arises 
from her anger that her father has asked for evidence of 
something that ought not to be proven. But this anger 
overreaches its intent and holds Cordelia's tongue silent just 
when she could have continued to speak in a mode of language 
that resonated with Lear's self as an abyss rather than with 
Lear's self as a bounded and fixed entity. Thus, the failure of 
Lear to respond to Cordelia is not simply his refusal to hear an 
answer. In her second reply, Cordelia also refuses to speak her
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love to Lear.
Representational language, even in the more reasonable 
sense of Cordelia's second speech, will not save Lear. Speech 
that would resound in the "nothing" of Cordelia's first answer 
offers hope that language will be able to enlanguage Lear's 
self. The remainder of the play becomes a struggle to speak 
Lear's self in this new resonance of language. Lear learns to 
speak poetically. But first he must be weaned from his
representational notion of speaking. Goneril and Regan have
charmed him with their promises of a stable yet boundless love. 
This love is repudiated by them as Lear becomes a nuisance, a 
cross, old man disrupting the life of their courts. Goneril's 
insistence that he give up his personal guard, which is also an
insistence that Lear let go his fixed image of himself as the
still-powerful, bénéficient king-father, begins his unnerving:
Lear: Does any here know me? This is not Lear.
Does Lear walk thus? Speak thus? Where are his eyes?
Either his notion weakens, his discernings
Are lethargied— Ha ! Waking? 'Tis not so.
Who is it that can tell me who I am?
Fool: Lear's shadow.[19]
Lear's question is curiously compounded. lie demands both 
"Who am I?" and "Who is it that can tell me?". Implicit in 
these questions is the realization that a "you," a "stranger," 
must appear if his question is to be answered. He asks "Who am 
I?" but now finds he must also discover "Who are you?". Before 
this moment Lear had been more or less content that he knew who 
he was; he had not been a stranger to himself. Now his own 
self begins to escape his grasp. He finds his self foreign to
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his own sense of who he is: "This is not Lear."
The fool's rejoinder to Lear's demand is profoundly 
disconcerting. We do not normally consider our shadows 
authoritative. In fact they are often viewed as a mere residue
of our presence. We do not turn to our shadows to discover
their significance. Rather we turn to the referent of our 
shadows, to our own bodies where the sign of the shadow is given
a reality. But the fool directs Lear to his shadow. Perhaps he
wishes to suggest that Lear has been accustomed to identify 
himself with what were only mere shadows. These mere shadows 
were the very stuff of the world: kingship, power, loyalty,
parenthood. But now they have failed him, their temporality 
denying Lear's very substance.
But, perhaps the fool's answer is also a poetic attempt to 
direct Lear to the very location where he might find a 
respondent to his disturbing question, Lear's former self can 
no longer tell Lear who he is. Rather Lear's shadow must tell 
him. As young Malte who searches the mirror and finds his 
absence, Lear must also search for himself directly in the face 
of his absence. This absence forces Lear to become other to 
himself. Thus, his madness is revealed.
But the fool is also Lear's shadow. In the fool's speaking 
we find an evocation of Lear's self that resonates in the 
"nothing" of Cordelia. He probes Lear's conscience with a 
poetic and veiled speaking. He tells Lear he must talk with his 
"shadow." Since representational language has failed to provide
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Lear with his sense of self, Lear must turn with deeper and 
deeper foreboding to this other manner of speaking, a fool's 
speaking.
Thus, Lear's madness is more than madness; it is also the
unleashing of a profoundly poetic speaking. This speaking does
not paint us a picture of Lear, Instead his speaking forcefully
addresses the earth-shaking storm, this storm that offers
neither homage nor love to the lost king. Yet, Lear's mad
poetry is not his undoing. Miraculously, at precisely the
moment that Lear casts off the vestiges of any representation of
himself, something new is uncovered. Within storm's womb he
turns to Tom o'Bedlam and states:
Thou art the thing itself; unaccomadated man 
is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal 
as thou art. Off, off you lendings!
Come, unbutton here,[20]
With these words Lear tears off his cloak.
But his nakedness before the storm no longer denies his 
self. In his gesture before the fool, Lear finally acknowledges 
his ovm relation with the things and beings around him, Lear 
becomes the "thing itself," the "shadow," the "fool," He finds
he is with all other men in his new found nakedness. This
achievement of humility leads him to evoke a world in his 
speaking rather than demanding one, Lear returns from the 
wilderness with a curious and playful openness to all those
around him. His sadness and rage endure, but he is no longer 
consumed by a mania for self possession. Finding himself before 
Cordelia he states:
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Pray, do not mock me.
I am a very foolish fond old man.
Fourscore and upward, not an hour more nor less.[21]
This new Lear speaks differently. Words are no longer
evidence for other matters; they take on in themselves a value.
When he and Cordelia are captured by Edmund, Cordelia speaks of
having "incurred the worst." Lear's response is remarkable:
. . Come let's away to prison:
We two alone will sing like birds i ' th'cage 
When thou dost ask me blessing. I ’ll kneel down 
And ask of thee forgiveness: so we'll live.
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
Talk of court news; and we'll talk with them too.
Who looses and who wins, who's in, who's out;
And take upon's the mystery of things.
As if we were God's spies: and we'll wear out 
In a walled prison, packs and sects of great ones 
That ebb and flow by the moon.[22]
Here we discover a language that invents, that plays, that un­
covers mystery. Lear sings his love for Cordelia by speaking 
poetically. He no longer demands of language to represent signi­
ficance that would make his being-in-the-world secure. Rather, 
his language erupts from the very location where he is least in 
control of his destiny. The full destructiveness of the world 
has been made evident, and yet Lear gives himself over to this 
world, acknowledging its claim upon him. His language now calls 
out of himself and into a deepened sharing of the world's signi­
ficance with Cordelia, with Kent and even with his two other 
daughters.
Lear's self, that darkened maddened thing that seemed 
stripped of itself past any recognition of what it was, now
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becomes miraculously transparent. Lear is Lear in that he is 
with Cordelia. His self presences in its holding of Cordelia 
through the evocation of his language. But there is a final 
stripping, a final failure of the world to sustain Lear's hope 
for meaning that is heart-rending. Lear enters with Cordelia 
lying dead in his arms. She has been hanged.[23] Lear's agony 
reverberates in his final words over Cordelia's body:
And my poor fool is hanged: no, no, no life?
Why should a dog, a horse, a rat have life.
And thou no breath at all? Thou'It come no more.
Never, never, never, never, never.
Pray you undo this button. Thank you sir.
Do you see this? Look on her. Look her lips
Look there, look there . . .
he dies.[24]
But even Cordelia's death will not destroy the authority of 
Lear's speaking. His language still holds Cordelia with us, even 
as her corpse is laid before us. Lear's call to the others 
around him to look upon her brings Cordelia before us even in 
the silence of her death. When he murmurs "look there, look
there," his speaking calls up Cordelia precisely at that moment
when she seems finally reduced to a pure object, a pure "it," 
having become a cadaver. But to see Cordelia as a cadaver is 
blasphemous. This realization demonstrates the authority of 
Lear's speaking.
Language no longer attempts to represent either Lear or 
Cordelia to us in this passage. But it does call us as
listeners into a silence that encompasses even as it rends the
human self. After speaking Lear also dies. His death breaks
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all images of his self. Yet his silence calls out to all around 
him with a terrible ferocity of concern. The silence of Lear's 
death speaks and resounds with the voice of a real self who cem 
look upon the world but cannot look upon itself, a self in which 
an abyss has spoken.
Insofar as Lear or his daughters had attempted to speak 
their selves as representable entities, language became 
transparent in an effort to give us a picture of their selves.
In this mode language becomes a technique, a tool for making
evident what already has occurred, or what one already possesses. 
Such a language exists for its own negation. But as this 
language fails Lear, Lear searches out a new language which no 
longer serves as Lear's shadow. In this new language Lear finds 
himself other than himself. At first this realization threatens 
to dissolve his self. He fears and fights against his madness.
Yet when he can no longer hold to his former self— as young
Malte Briggs who stared into the mirror until the mirror finally 
spoke who he was— Lear now lets language mediate rather than 
represent himself. His "shadow" speaks. But this madness does 
not consume Lear with its "all shaking thunder" that threatens 
to "strike flat the thick rotundity o' th'world."[25] In fact, 
Lear not only survives his madness, but finds himself enriched 
at its end. However, madness alone will not save Lear. He must 
come again to himself by opening his self to the significance of 
other things and other beings. He comes again to a sense of his
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self at the play's end. But this coining to himself no longer 
finds a self that is possessed.
At the play's end Lear speaks both himself and Cordelia in 
a meuiner for which representational language would be hard 
pressed to account. In this speaking his words ring with 
authority because they no longer separate Lear from others in 
the world. Nor do the words separate themselves from Lear in 
order to speak for his self. These words are Lear, and in them 
he uncovers a significance that has haunted him throughout the 
play.
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FOOTNOTES
^This analysis is a simplification of Sartre's position 
in relation to the self in Being and Nothingness 
(New York, 1966), trans. Hazel E. Barnes. Sartre's 
basic position states that if we seek to be a self, 
we can only fulfill our project by having a self.
Without the ability to possess itself, the self 
vanishes. This being the case, Sartre concludes that 
the self is not a being, but a nothingness. This 
conclusion brings about the problem of bad faith, in 
which the self attempts to loose the anxiety of its 
nothingness by the immersion of its identity in a 
thing (a "for-itself"), even if that thing be its 
own body. My own position will be that Sartre's 
dilemma between being and nothingness occurs only 
if we insist on a purely representational language 
to describe the problem of the self. Once we open 
our discourse to the poetic saying of the self, 
such as occurs in King Lear, the problem of thing­
ness becomes irrelevant to the self's identity.
In poetic language the identity of the self with 
any thing (whether it be one's own body, the body 
of a loved one or the crown upon one's head) be­
comes metaphorical rather than representable. It 
is the self's speaking and the intentions arising 
out of this speaking rather than any thing which 
underlies the existence of the self.
2Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having (New York, 1965), 
p. 168.
^Ibid., p. 169.
^Gilbert Ryle, Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), p.19.
It should be noted that while Ryle and I agree on this 
limited point, we are in fact miles apart when it comes 
to the essential nature of the self.
^This analysis of gazer and mirror owes much to a similar 
analysis by Merleau-Ponty in his essay, "Eye and Mind," 
The Primacy of Perception (Chicago, 1964), trans. James 
M. Edie, p. 16 8. Merleau-Ponty distinguishes "resemblance" 
from "representation" to explain the ontological roots 
of various European painters' appreciations of the gaze 
and the mirror.
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Ranier-Marie Rilke, The Notebooks of Malte Lauride 
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THE SAYING OF SILENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION
Part of the primitive fascination of a story is this, 
that we often cannot be sure why it has been told. 
Often we can: it may say, I am Odysseus, this happened
to me: share my self esteem; or. This may happen to
you King Pentheus, be prepared; or. This happened here
in Athens: know how to feel. Or often: You will wish
this might happen to you. But devoid of arteries from 
me, or you, or here, why does that tale's heart beat?
A sower went out to sow his seed...; or, A governess
went to Bly, where there had been servants named Quint 
and Jessel, undesirable people, and the two children...
Why are we being told that?[l]
While Hugh Kenner comments in this passage concerning the
literary heritage left to Ezra Pound by Henry James, the 
question that is posed is one of universal significance to the 
study of literature. Inevitably our fascination with artistic 
works leads us to pose our questions of them. The responses to 
these questions often take their form as an assigning of certain 
meanings to certain aspects of the work. Uncovering an 
intricate web of correspondences, we trace diverse paths between 
the literary work and its new found significances. We say that 
we have given an interpretation of the work, as if this too were 
part of the same process that the work had begun. We say that 
we are now better acquainted with this piece of literature.
But are we? Or is interpretation simply the imposition of
a reader upon a work that he does not understand and which his
interpretation by its very nature will distort, misrepresent and 
finally destroy? Susan Sontag in her essay, "Against 
Interpretation," first defines and then attacks this manner of
coming to terms with literature.
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By interpretation, I mean here a conscious act of the 
mind which illustrates a certain code, certain "rules" 
of interpretation. Directed to art, interpretation 
means plucking a set of elements (the X, the Y, the Z 
and so forth) from the whole work. The task of 
interpretation is virtually one of translation. The 
interpreter says. Look, don't you see that X is 
really— or really means— A? That Y is really B? That 
Z is really C?(2]
Sontag argues that interpretation presumes that one element
within the work stands for or represents another element that is
more real, being outside the work and part of the "actual"
world.
Thus, the interpreter unmasks the meaning of a poeticizing,
by making what seems to be a mute image within the work speak
its significance by demonstrating precisely what it represents.
Sontag objects to this strategy since it so radically devalues
what we experience as the poetic image in favor of a conceptual
content that the image holds in code-like form.
The modern style of interpretation excavates, and as it 
excavates destroys; it digs "behind" the text, to find 
a subtext which is the true one. The most celebrated 
and influential doctrines, those of Marx and Freud, 
actually amount to elaborate systems of hermeneutics, 
aggressive and impious theories of interpretation. All 
observable phenomena are bracketed, in Freud's phrase
as manifest content. This manifest content must be
probed and pushed aside to find the true meaning— the 
latent content— beneath.[3]
Sontag calls this strategy "the revenge of the intellect upon
art."
Even more. It is the revenge of the intellect upon the 
world. To interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the 
world— in order to set up a shadow world of "meanings."
It is to turn the world into this world. (This world!
As if there were any other.) The world, our world is 
depleted, impoverished enough. Away with all 
duplicates of it, until we again experience more
immediately what we have.[4]
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Interpretation authorizes a new series of utterances to 
take the place of the poetic utterance. Such a strategy 
tells the work of art that which it is about. Such a 
strategy can only take place when the work has become like 
an object with fixed and stable boundaries so that we can 
place a correspondence between each poetic image and its 
"actual" significance.
Susan Sontag's criticism of interpretation is justified
as long as we regard her definition of it as exhaustive.
But is it exhaustive? I think not. Rather, she presupposes
that interpretation could only reflect a certain type of
thinking which by its very nature would damage the literary
work when it attempted to understand it. Such a thinking
sees the work as nothing more than an object before its
understanding, an object which has certain determinate
qualities which, if we are patient, can be exhaustively
explicated. Heidegger characterizes such a thinking as
"representational thinking" which David White has
characterized as
thinking which characterizes the entity thought and the 
entity thinking in a certain definite manner. Thus, 
"representing means to bring something before oneself 
and have it for oneself, to have something present to 
oneself as subject."(FD p.106). And again, 
"representing presents the object in that it represents 
the object to the subject through which representation 
the subject presents itself as such."(H 
pp.121-22)...The result, stated in general terms is 
that "contemporary philosophy experiences the being of 
an entity as the object. The entity comes to such 
standing in opposition through perception and for 
perception." (VA p. 254)[5]
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One of the inherent characteristics of representational
thought is that in placing an object before the subjecty the
subject's receptivity to the object is conditioned by the fact
that the subject must remain subject and the object must remain
object. To imply that there is not a clear distinction between
the subject and the object would be to imply that the object
somehow invaded the subject and made the subject other than
itself. In such a case the subject would lose its nature.
Thusf if the subject is to remain subject, its knowledge must be
a sort of possessing. It possesses the object of knowledge in
such a way that the object is at its disposal. Such an attitude
leads the subject to adopt a "technological" attitude towards
the contents of its knowledge. Heidegger explains that such
attitudes are brought about
..by the positioning that belongs to representation 
that Nature is brought before man. Man places before 
himself the world as the whole of everything objective, 
and he places himself before the world. Man sets up 
the world toward himself, and delivers Nature over to 
himself. When Nature is not satisfactory to man's 
representation, he reframes or redisposes it. Man
transposes things when they are in his way.[6]
Heidegger characterizes such a "positioning" or "pre-positing"
as “willing." Man objectifies the world by his self assertion as
subject to which all else serves as object.
To such a willing, everything, beforehand, and thus
subsequently turns irresistibly into material for 
self-assertive production. The earth and its
atmosphere become raw material. Man becomes human 
material, which is disposed of with a view to proposed 
goals. The un-conditioned establishment of the 
unconditional self-assertion by which the world is
purposefully made over according to the frame of mind 
of man's command is a process that emerges from the
hidden nature of technology.[7J
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In like manner, the promise of representational 
interpretation becomes to render the poeticizing of any man 
comprehensible by making it into an objectified meaning which we 
can possess. The storm in The Tempest does not unsettle us with 
its dark savagery and utter indifference to human perspective. 
Rather representational interpretation transforms it into the 
raging waters of the human id which Freudian psychiatry has so 
successfully uncovered. Further, we may by certain techniques 
quell and redistribute the unsettledness of any such psychic 
storm. Thus, Prospero is the prototype of the benevolent 
psychiatrist. And so forth.
Once a work has been interpreted in such a manner, these 
new significances seem subject to the same vicious circle of 
objectification and reinterprêtâtion. For these new meanings 
also stand before the subject as objects of its own knov/ledge. 
Thus, one might argue for an infinity of such interpretations, 
each shattering the appearance of the one coming before it and 
yet each in the end assuming an appearance to be shattered. For 
if C is really Y, the inevitable question must arise as to what 
can Y really be. The underlying implication of representational 
interpretation must be that there are primary and irreducible 
meanings which compose more apparent, complex meanings. This 
offers our only escape from an endless succession of 
interpretations. Yet, the practice of interpretation upon 
poetic works seems to point to just the opposite experience. 
The various interpretations of an image multiply the 
complexities of the work in question. No one seems to agree to
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exactly what a certain image ought to be reduced. Poetic 
speaking is criticized for its vagueness and indeterminateness. 
Its richness of evocation becomes problematic. The logical 
positivist argues that all such evocation is mere froth, a 
subjective titillation of our emotive capacities. The truth of 
"To be or not to be" is that it is a tautology.(8] To speak of 
the substance of poeticizing is to speak of confusion.
The implication underlying representational interpretation 
is that language is man's possession. Interpretation makes this 
possession useful, by substituting a "real" significance for the 
poetic image. The image itself is simply a lens which focuses a 
latent content before us. Poetry's function is auxiliary to
significance: it makes significance more concrete at times, but
it is not of itself significant. Thus, man is the measure of
language. Language, as the object of his attention, is
significant only if it is capable of showing him "what" it 
represents. If language cannot show him this representation, 
then language fails to "measure up" to the demands of the 
subject who has posited himself as the subject before the 
objectified world. Thus, he may discard such language, saying 
it is meaningless.
But Heidegger states after Holderlin that poetry measures 
us. This measure is not available to representational thinking 
where man assumes that language is his possession.
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Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of 
language, while in fact language remains the master of 
man...For strictly, it is language that speaks. Man 
first speaks when, and only when, he responds to 
language by listening to its appeal. Language beckons 
us, at first and then again at the end toward a thing's 
nature. But that is not to say, ever, that in any 
word-meaning picked up at will language supplies us,
straight away and definitively, with the transparent 
nature of the matter as if it were an object ready made 
for use.19]
If language measures man, then the role of interpretation 
in relation to language would necessarily change. 
Interpretation would no longer take hold of language to demand
its significance. Instead, interpretation would find itself
questioned at every turn by a language that engages it and by 
which it receives its authorization.
Such an interpretation, which I will term "poetic," would
not struggle to reduce the poetic image to a specific latent
content which is termed "more real." Rather, poetic
interpretation would listen closely to how the universe of words
both within and without the work suggest limits to one another.
This view of a work regards the whole of the work as forming a
language field which by its tensions and correlations voices a
world of relationships. Further, we would bring all of our
language to the literary work in such an interpretation in order
to gather the work into the whole of language. The whole of
language is not a finished structure in which all relationships
have once and for all time been made clear. Language changes
precisely because nev/ literature is written.
No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning 
alone... The existing monuments form an ideal order 
among themselves, which is modified by the introduction
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of the new (the really new) work of art among them.
The existing order is complete before the new work
arrives; for order to persist after the supervention 
of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever 
so slightly, altered; and so the relations,
proportions, values of each work of art toward the
whole are readjusted; and this is conformity between 
the old and the new. Whoever has approved this idea of 
order... will not find it preposterous that the past 
should be altered by the present as much as the present 
is directed by the past.[10]
If we wish to gather a work into the whole of language and the
whole of language to be gathered into the work, interpretation
will be inherently open-ended. Its measuring of us is never
finished.
But how is it that we can be measured by poetic language?
Heidegger speaks of this measuring as that "by which man first
receives the measure for the breadth of his being." The breadth
of this measure shows us that "man exists as a mortal," that is,
he is capable of death. But against what are v/e measured? This
question seeks to demand the measure of that by which language
itself is authorized to measure. More succinctly, we are
demanding to measure the standard by which we are measured.
Heidegger terms the essence of this authority to measure that is
found in poetic language as the divine. He quotes a poem by
Holderlin:
..Yes.As long as Kindness,
The Pure, still stays with his heart, man 
Not unhappily measures himself 
Against the godhead. Is God unknown?
Is he manifest like the sky? I'd sooner 
Believe the latter. It's the measure of man.[11]
Heidegger concludes from these lines that
The measure consists in the way in which the god who 
remains unknown, is revealed as such by the sky. God's 
appearance through the sky consists in a disclosing that
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lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by 
seeking to wrest what is concealed out of its 
concealedness, but only by guarding the concealed in its 
self-concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the
unknown by way of the sky's manifestness. This appearance
is the measure against which man measures himself.[12]
One could easily dismiss such an analysis of language as 
fanciful. One might begin by asking by what authority does
Heidegger derive his conclusion from the reading of one poem
that man is measured by the divine as concealed in language and 
especially in poetic language? Further, how is it that an 
"unknown" entity appears as the "unknown" by the way of another 
entity's "manifestness"?
Heidegger can only respond that insofar as poetic language 
takes upon itself the measure which measures man, his analysis 
will be experienced as true. Ultimately we must appeal to 
poetic language itself for the authority of his statements 
concerning it. But such language cannot be used as evidence 
that Heidegger is correct. If we could use it as evidence, we 
would be able to measure the very measure that measures us. 
This is precisely what Heidegger denies is possible. Rather we 
must put ourselves before poetry. Insofar as we are measured, 
language will "evidence" that measure, that is, the "godhead."
This position is not unlike the Judeo-prophetic position in 
regard to language. Yaweh demands of Isiah; "Go, and say to 
this people, 'Hear and hear again, but do not understand; see 
and see again^ but do not perceive.'" (Isa. 6:9) As Herbert 
Schneidau points out, "these words evoke the function of the
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parable,"[13J a speaking of language which like the poet's
speaking measures man rather than being measured by him.
Serious literature at all levels is built around this 
function, of revealing and concealing at the same time.
It has nothing for those who share the positivist creed 
that "everything that can be expressed, can be 
expressed clearly," and thus that interpretation should 
yield something plain and obvious. In effect 
literature seems to be straining with signification, 
yet we are never confident that what it is saying can 
be reduced, for more than certain superficial purposes, 
to a descriptive state of meaning.[14]
This inability to unravel the signification of a text does
not argue against the project of interpretation. But we must
"acknowledge how precarious is our grasp of any meaning in the
world at all and that we force ourselves to probe the words and
forms before us in a never-ending labor."[15] Like Heidegger,
Schneidau argues that we must give up attempting to secure the
significance of a text through a representationalist
interpretation. Instead, our sense of interpretation must
become parabolic. Heidegger's description of the poetic image
carries the same sense of revealing and concealing as Schneidau
evokes in his analysis of language:
The poet makes poetry only when he takes the measure, 
by saying the sights of heaven in such a way that he 
submits to its appearances as to the alien element to 
which the unknown god has "yielded." Because poetry 
takes that mysterious measure, to wit, in the face of 
the sky, therefore it speaks in "images." ..The poetic 
saying of images gathers the brightness and sound of 
the heavenly appearances into one with the darkness and 
silence of what is alien. By such sights god surprises 
us. In this strangeness he proclaims his unfaltering 
nearness.[16]
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Heidegger states that the poet mixes the world that we 
recognize with the "darkness and silence of what is alien." 
Could not this silence be as important as any overt naming of 
the divine? If language only existed as a representation, then 
silence could not call out, since it would represent "nothing," 
In such a silence no object sets itself before us; therefore, 
we say that silence is ignorance. If language is silent, then 
there is nothing to be said. But if poetic language is not 
exhausted by a representational interpretation, then silence 
could play an important part in a poet's poeticizing, if that 
poeticizing were receptive to silence.
The problem could be rephrased in this manner: How could
poeticizing show representationally that which grounds its 
saying? We experience that poeticizing (and language in 
general) brings us near to what Heidegger calls "presencing." 
This presencing comes about in poetry when language gathers the 
various interfoldings of things and events (the Fourfold) so 
that the interplay of the earth, the heavens, man and the divine 
are brought near to one another while yet keeping their 
difference.
But the nearness of the divine is "oppresing" according to 
Heidegger,[17] The divine grounds the world even as it 
interplays with it. Thus, the divine announces itself from what 
Heidegger terms the silence that makes language and the world 
possible. The divine's silence makes a place for poeticizing to 
speak. It is necessarily silent so that poeticizing may
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announce the world. How then can poeticizing announce the
divine? If poeticizing represented the divine to us, the divine
could no longer be the silence that precedes overt naming. But
if language is silent in ignorance, then neither can the silence
which makes representation possible announce itself as
meaningful silence, since it will be mistaken for the lack of an
announcement. But the silence we wish to consider is not
nothing. Rather it is the absence in which that which cannot be
represented seeks to announce itself. Heidegger states:
The poet becomes compelled by holiness into a saying 
which is only a still naming.
The name in which this naming speaks must be dark.
The place from which the poet is obliged to name the gods 
must be thus: that for him, what is to be named remains 
that which is approaching. In order to open this 
remoteness
as remoteness the poem must withdraw from the oppressing 
nearness of the gods and "name" them "only softly."[18]
It is my judgment that The Tempest of William Shakespeare 
does exactly this: the play's language withdraws from the
oppressive nearness of the gods and "names them only softly."
The Tempest is Shakespeare's last (or next to last) play; 
critics have found it difficult to interpret. As Phillip 
Edwards remarks of Shakespeare's last plays in general: "Though
we may be convinced because of the constant insistence, that the 
Romances are important, it is hard to point to the critic who 
has shown where the importance lies."[19] Again Theodore Spencer 
echoes other critics when he writes that The Tempest is "a play
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with so many layers of meaning that no single interpretation can 
do it justice."(20] The Tempest is admired and yet often seems 
inaccessible to the critical reader.
If we grant Heidegger's understanding of language, and if 
its implications in regards to our interpretation of literature 
are correct, how could v/e best approach this play? Rather than 
casting out representational interpretation all together, we 
might search out such interpretations as a natural feature of 
the play's language. The result of such a consideration would 
not sum up the play, but it would widen the context from which a 
possible silence, to which the poeticizing of the play might be 
receptive, could be made more apparent. We would expect a sort 
of gap to open up in the structure of the play that would 
continually surround any attempt to reduce the play to a 
representation of what is spoken. This gap would be a hint at 
the silence of the play. It would bring us back to the play' 
again and again to find that silence in a more comprehensive 
manner. In a sense the best criticism might not abandon 
representational interpretation, but would take it to its limits 
to show how an abyss undermines it at every turn. Yet, this 
"undermining" would not be a destruction of language, but an 
enriching, since language would begin to "oscillate" between its 
speaking and the ground for its speaking. The undermining 
qualities of that silence would not contradict the naming of 
things and events by the poet, but would give them a context by 
which the world could be gathered into the language of the play. 
In such a manner the divine might make its "dark" appearance.
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*
Is The Tensest receptive to such a critical approach? I
think so. Prospero, the central character of the play, is oddly
resistant to representational strategies. Leo Marx in The
Machine and the Garden describes Prospero:
His survival and his triumph rest upon art, a white 
magic akin to science and technology. As readers of 
the Golden Bough or the work of Malinowski know, there 
are close affinities between magic and m o d e m  science, 
particularly in the tacit views of man's necessary 
posture in the face of physical nature. Both
presuppose our ability and our need to master the 
non-human through activity of the mind. The aim of 
Prospero's magic, as his relations with Ariel and 
Caliban show, is to keep the elements of air, earth, 
fire and water at work in the service of his island 
community. He does not share Gonzalo's faith in what 
"Nature should produce/without sweat or e n d e a v o u r [21]
John Fowle's description of Prospero's "triumph" is oddly
dissonant with Marx's view of the power of his "white magic."
True, two young people fall in love, but out of their 
own nature, not magic. A fuddleheaded but kind old
man, Gonzalo, remains fuddleheaded and kind to the end;
two cynical scheming politicians demonstrate by their
final bitter silence that they will always be so; two 
seamen-buffoons and an Indian "savage" stay unredeemed.
Even the spirit-agent Ariel seems anxious to be freed 
from playing assistant to any more such futile 
experiments. Only Alonso, who conspired in the 
usurpation, shows any plausible repentance; but he has 
very little to lose by changing sides...It is certainly 
not difficult to read, even in Prospero himself, a
suspicion that he has in vain tried to surpass that
other sea-magician and pig maker who hides behind
Caliban's Bermuda-inspired mother Sycorax, Circe. The
"every third thought shall be my grave" he prophesies 
of his return to Milan is hardly a happy final note.
He forgives as Circe and Calypso forgave their visitor 
(his last command to Ariel repeats tneir last gift to 
Odysseus, the provision of a fair wind) , but the 
forgiveness is also like theirs in its air of forced 
circumstance, of noblesse oblige. No hearts have
changed.[22]
Who then is this man Prospero, and what sort of project does he
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take upon himself? In one sense we can readily observe that he
is blessed with a "power," through which he attempts to perform
an elaborate ritual of initiation for the benefit of his island
visitors. As to the nature of this ritual of initiation it is
all too easy to jump to conclusions. It seems that Prospero
wishes to enact a series of confrontations between various
characters and their past mistakes or future destinies. It also
seems that these confrontations serve to bring them to
self-knowledge and the ability to build and inhabit a "brave new
world," a utopia where every man will achieve the fulfillment of
his most noble nature. But there seems to be a rub to this
hope. Fowles continues;
The play may outwardly demonstrate true culture, or 
moral nobility triumphing over both false culture and 
culturelessness; but it throws strange doubts and 
shadows on its own message and on its very form. The 
conflict revealed is the oldest in all art, and takes 
place inside the artist; between the power to imagine 
and the use of imagining. Cui bono, to what purpose?
What will it change?[23J
This paradoxical impotence of Prospero*s power appears most
acute in relation to his own view of that play or series of
tasks which he has enacted. No matter how much Prospero may
delight in the exercise of magic, finally he moves no man's
heart, not even his own I George Slover notes:
When the time comes for him to play his personal part 
in the imitation of the providential action, Prospero 
finds, I think, that his noble reason is not a match 
for his fury. He discovers that though his magic can 
bring all his enemies to lie at his mercy, it cannot 
move his mercy to raise them up to be themselves. He 
must first abjure his magic (as Alonso later resigns 
his dukedom) and then stand with the rest in the circle 
of disenchantment drawn by himself.[24]
Slover's analysis refers to a crucial part of the play: Ariel
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returns from the various tasks upon which Prospero has sent him. 
He reports that
Your charm so strongly works 'em 
That if you now beheld them, your affections 
Would become tender . '
Dost thou think so, spirit?
Hast thou, which art but air, a touch, a feeling 
Of their affliction, and shall not myself 
One of their kind, that relish all as sharply 
Passion as they, be kindlier moved than thou art?
Though with their high-wrongs I am struck to th'quick.
Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
Do I take part. The rarer action is
In virtue than in vengeance. They being penitent.
The sole drift of ray purpose doth extend 
Not a frown further. Go, release them, Ariel,
My charms I'll break, their sense I'll restore,
And they shall be themselves.[25]
Immediately after these words Prospero casts down his books and
his staff "deeper than did ever plummet sound," saying "this
rough magic I here abjure."[26] He then places himself in the
circle of his former associates to become again part of their
world, now free of his power, of his ability to conjure over
them.
Yet, as powerless as his power may be. The Tempest revolves 
around this magic of Prospero. Without it the tempest itself 
would never have been raised, Ferdinand would never have met 
Miranda, Alonso would never have been shipwrecked to confront 
his guilt for past deeds or the loss of his only son. All the 
characters are touched by this power. But the power is cast off 
by Prospero in the end; he even plans to cast it off from the 
beginning. And as he casts it off he enters the circle of his 
compatriots as their equal and not as their master. His claim 
to his throne is granted him by Alonso of his own free will.
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His brother harbors resentment because of this. His daughter
loves from her own power of love. Further, as long as Prospero
practices his power he seems alienated from those upon whom he
practices it. The magic is oddly impotent; Prospero terms it
"rough." Finally, Prospero seems to gain a power by giving up
this power; he can now step into the human circle rather theui
remain outside it. One senses that Prosperous powerlessness at
the play's end is somehow more commanding than any of the great
feats of magic that he had already performed.
Given this background, one wonders : What was the original
intention of Prospero? Many commentators, including Marx and
Frye speak of an intention of Prospero to institute culture and
morality in a semi-utopiem setting. It is thus only in the
dissolution of this utopian setting that the real effect of
Prospero's intentions may be b o m  into the "real" world. This
implies that the world within the play is somehow less them or
at least other than the real. The island upon which these men
land is implicitly different than the real world; there is a
barrier between it and Naples, a barrier where Prospero must
throw down his book and staff in order to cross it.
This explanation offers what appears to be a cogent account
as to why Prospero must leave the island. However, a further
problem arises within the play; Prospero reflects near the
play's end concerning this "real" world to which Prospero is
about to return.
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision 
The cloud-capped tow'rs, the gorgeous palaces 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself.
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Yea, all which it inherits, shall ye 
And like this insubstantial pageant faded
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff 
As dreams are made on, and our little life 
Is rounded with a sleep. Sir, I am vexed.
Bear with my weakness: my old brain is troubled 
Be not disturbed with my infirmity.
If you be pleased, retire into my cell 
And there repose. A turn or two I'll walk 
To still my beating mind.
At the very end of the play Prospero remarks enigmatically that
he will "retire to my Milan, where every third thought shall be
my grave."
Northrop Frye has appealed to this speech as evidence that
Iba Tempest is not a "religious drama," nor an "allegory":
If it were, Prospero's great "revels" speech would say, not 
merely that all earthly things will vanish, but that an 
eternal world will take their place. In a religious 
context Prospero's renunciation of magic would represent 
the resigning of his will to a divine will, one that can do 
what the boatswain says Gonzalo cannot do, command the
elements to silence and work the peace of the
present...[27]
Frye argues that if the play were religious drama, the
divine would be overtly made relevant to the structure of the 
play. However, Frye insists that this relevance would announce 
itself allegorically so that the divine order could be overtly 
named. This would make the divine present before us as a 
representable content of the play's poeticizing. However, the 
play does not make the divine apparent in such a manner; thus,
the play is not religious. But we must ask ourselves if it is
only in religious drama that the divine will announce itself. 
The next step in my analysis will attempt to lay a context for 
the "revels" speech that will show the possiblity of the
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appearance of the divine, even if the play is not, as Frye
contends, a religious drama.
Prospero states "our little life is rounded with a sleep."
In fact, is not Prospero's very project to begin his death? The
play encompasses the problem of what constitutes a just society;
it reflects upon the problem of revenge; but finally Prospero
seeks out the terms of his death.
If death is a major theme of The Tempest is there not then
the spectre of nihilism rising within the play to crush the
fragile aspirations of its participants with the "sleep" that
"rounds our little lives?" Within these lines we find a
darkness, an abyss that hovers within the poeticizing of the
play. It is present in Ferdinand's fear of his father's death
and in his father's fear of his son's death. Caliban plots
Prospero's death and finds his equals in the dark MacBeth-like
musings of Sebastian and Antonio. Ariel wishes to end his
association with human servitude, and rebels at every turn.
Finally this darkness hovers most deeply in Prospero himself,
who muses upon a world which is "this insubstantial pageant
faded” which "vexes" him, which is an "infirmity." These
thoughts disturb him so that he must "still" his "beating mind."
At this moment Ariel appears. Prospero speaks anxiously to him:
"Come with a thought. I thank thee, Ariel. Come."
Perhaps we can begin to comprehend with greater sensitivity
the intention behind Prospero's magic.
"Sleep" in The Tempest is the ultimate horizon. Or is that 
horizon the utterly mysterious reality to which sleepers
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shall awake? Prom the perspective of this consciousness 
our life appears not only "little" but "such stuff/As 
dreams are made on."[28]
Slover makes two points here: First, that sleep is the ultimate
horizon; Second, that from the perspective of sleep our life
might or might not appear insignificant and meaningless. The
threat of nihilism within The Tempest is ponderous. It
disturbs, unsettles its main character and in the end is the
focal point of his great project. Because of his success he is
free, but only to go to Milan "where every third thought shall
be my grave."
But if this play were only a grammar of nihilism, why then 
would Prospero cast down his book and staff "deeper than did 
ever plummet sound"? Why indeed? Given the world we have just 
drawn, his chief motivation would be to keep his power over 
dreams and this insubstantial world as long as he might. Must 
we conclude that Prospero despairs when he gives up what little 
power he had come to possess. Like Odysseus before him he is 
given the paradox of immortality. He may remain a magician and 
thus, one might suppose, immortal. But the price is his 
exclusion from the very circle which he enters at the play’s 
end, the circle of his friends and enemies, the circle of his 
own humanity. The price of his humanity is his death; but if 
death is indeed a nihilism, a sleep which darkens all that has 
gone before, what then should we think of such a decision? 
Should we say that Prospero has thrown down the cloak of the 
magician only to become a fool?
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Perhaps. But the question of Prospero's death is echoed 
early in the play with the fictitious deaths of Alonso and 
Ferdinand. The mock death of Ferdinand's father makes him 
distraught, but his sorrow is dissolved in his new found love 
for Miranda. Alonso's sorrow plummets to the very limits of his 
soul, and he finds his very sanity threatened by proof of his 
son's death. Unlike Ferdinand, he is an old man. He has tasted 
deeply of that darkness hovering in death. His youth no longer 
lies before him. Ferdinand's death confirms Alonso's mortality; 
not only will he die, but he will leave no one after him. In 
the midst of this crisis of father and son, Ariel sings
Full fathom five thy father lies;
Of his bones are coral made;
These are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange
Sea Nymphs hourly ring his knell...[29]
A silence rings in this poem, the silence of death. The 
words reach into that silence and bring back a saying. The 
saying is this: "Nothing of him doth fade, but doth suffer a
sea change into something rich and strange." Death reaches into 
the play again and again: the feigned deaths of Ferdinand and
Alonso, Prospero and Miranda's presumed deaths, the plotted 
murders of both Prospero and Alonso by a host of villains hungry 
for plunder of the world. We meet at the play's end the 
expectation of an inevitable death: Prospero's. We watch
Prospero choose to enter the circle of other men where he 
confronts this death, however troubling it may be. We begin to
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Something is lost. But what is lost suffers a "sea change into 
something rich and strange." Iha Tempest shows death as a 
measurement against which all human action places itself to find 
its significance. The silence of death speaks into the play. 
But this speaking is poetic and parabolic. We do not find a 
picture of death, but we do find an "image," as Heidegger would 
say it, of death. We hear that death is "rich and strange," a 
"sea change," a "sleep." Within that "sleep" lies that order 
which Frye complains Shakespeare has not alluded to in his play. 
We hear "softly" a disclosure which measures the breadth of our 
lives and which suggests to us an epiphany of the divine. Would 
we not misunderstand poetical saying if we demanded that 
Shakespeare explicate "sleep" for us, that he overtly name this 
silence and bring it out before us just as Prospero summons 
Ceres or Iris, dispossessed gods, to strut and play before us. 
These are the divine when it has become a spectacle.
When Prospero turns towards death in the play he sees 
ephemeral visions or he sees sleep. The "divine order" remains 
unannounced. Around the visions and dreams of men, there is 
only a silence. Yet Prospero throws down his book into this 
silence, breaks his cane and turns himself towards this eventual 
sleep. Yet even as this "sleep" extinguishes the lives of men, 
these very lives "suffer a sea change rich and strange." Just as 
in Prospero's magic, there is a powerlessness in poetical 
saying. The play and its saying can bring us to the limits of 
our humanity— our deaths. But here the play and its language 
can only listen for the divine. We hear the listening in the
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play's rich openness to death. The characters within the play
struggle with their deaths, their insubstantiality, at every
step of their initiation. Finally, at the play's end, even the
saying must die, must be silent. The play too is a temporal
thing and must end. The play too must die. As Prospero states
in his Epilogue:
And my ending is despair 
Unless I be relieved by prayer.
Which pierces so that it assaults 
Mercy itself and frees all faults.[30]
The poeticizing of Shakespeare within The Tempest is 
transformed by the "sleep" of death. However, this 
transformation does not come about by representing or picturing 
that which hides within death. Rather the language must becomes 
receptive to the silence of death. Poeticizing, when it is 
receptive to this silence, becomes transformative of human 
action. What saves the play is not a saving that comes to keep 
the play or its occupants free from death's silence. The 
silence has not made itself unsilent. But the play has 
announced a place for silence; it has made room for that which 
cannot be announced. As Prospero throws down his staff and his 
book, he announces the saying of silence within the play. His 
choice of death is rich and strange and, we sense, inherently 
right.
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FOOTNOTES
^Hugh Kenner, The Pound Era (Berkely, 1971), pp. 23-24.
2Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation (New York, 1966) , 
p. 5.
^Ibid., pp. 6-7.
^Ibid., p. 7.
^David White, Heidegger and the Language of Poetry 
(Licoln Nebraska, 1978), p. 149.
^Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans.
Albert Hofstadter (New York, 1975), p. 110.
^Ibid., p. 111.
O As related to me by Cynthia Schuster, PhD., this philoso­
phical position was once defended by Hans Reichenbach 
during one of her classes with him.
9Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 215.
^^T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1919) , 
Selected Essays (New York, 1960), pp. 4-5.
^^Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 219.
l^ibid., p. 220.
^^Herbert N. Schneidau, Sacred Discontent (Berkeley, 1977), 
p. 254.
l̂ Ibid.
^^Ibid., p. 255.
16Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, pp. 225-26
^^Martin Heidegger, Erlauterunzen zu Holderlins Dichtung 
(Frankfurt, 1971), pp.187-188.
l^ibid.
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19Phillip Edwards, "Shakespeare's Romances: 1900-57," 
Shakespeare Survey, ed. Allardyce Nicoli (Cambridge,
1958), p. 1.
20Theodore Spencer, Shakespeare and the Nature of Man 
(New York, 1943), p. 195.
21Leo Marx, The Machine and the Garden (New York, 1964) , 
p. 56.
22John Fowles, Islands (Boston, 1978), p. 98.
23lbid.
24George Slover, "Magic, Mystery and Make-Believe: An 
Anological Reading of the Tempest," Shakespeare Studies 
vol. XI (1978), p. 186.
25William Shakespeare, The Tempest, The Complete Works, 
ed. Alfred Harbage (Baltimore, 1969), Act V, Scene i, 
lines 17-32.
^^Ibid., lines 50, 51 and 56.
2?lbid., Act IV, Scene i, lines 151-163.
28Northrop Frye, "Introduction," The Tempest, The Complete 
Works of William Shakespeare, ed. Alfred Harbage 
(Baltimore, 1969), p. 1370.
29Slover, "Magic, Mystery and Make Believe...", p. 201. 
^^Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii, lines 397-403. 
^^Ibid., Epilogue, lines 15-18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Page 26
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Edwards, Phillip. "Shakespeare's Romances: 1900-57." 
Shakespeare Survey, ed. Allardyce Nicoli.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1958.
Eliot, T.S. Selected Essays. Harcourt & Brace: New York, 
1960.
Fowles, John. Islands. Little, Brown & Co.: Boston, 1978,
Heidegger, Martin. Poetry, Language, Thought. Harper & 
Row: New York, 1971.
-Erlauterunzen zu Holderlins Dichtung. Vittorio 
Klostermann: Frankfurt on the Main, 1971.
Kenner, Hugh. The Pound Era. University of California 
Press : Berkely, 1971.
Marx, Leo. The Machine and the Garden. Oxford University 
Press: New York, 1964.
Schneidau, Herbert N. Sacred Discontent. University of 
California Press: Berkely, 1971.
Shakespeare, William. The Complete Works, ed. Alfred 
Harbage. Penguin Books: Baltimore, 1969.
Slover, George. "Magic, Mystery and Make-believe: An 
Analogical Reading of The Tempest." Shakespeare 
Studies. Vol. XI. Burt Franklin & Co. 1978.
Sontag, Susan. Against Interpretation. Dell Publishing: 
New York, 1961.
Spencer, Theodore. Shakespeare and the Nature of Man. 
MacMillan Co.: New York, 1943.
White, David A. Heidegger and the Language of Poetry. 
University of Nebraska Press: Lincoln, Nebraska,
1978.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
